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1. Introduction
Schizophrenia is a complex clinical disorder that has a devastating impact on those who
suffer from it. The onset of the illness typically occurs in the early twenties, when individuals with
the disorder develop symptoms such as disorganized thinking and hallucinations, so-called
“positive symptoms”. These symptoms can be managed by pharmacological intervention in
some individuals. Other symptoms, like decreased speech production, decreased motivation,
and a decreased interest in things, termed “negative symptoms”, are more persistent and
currently have few effective therapeutic interventions. Further, individuals with schizophrenia
experience deficits of cognition in the domains of attention and cognitive control, for example,
which further complicate the lives and treatment outcomes for individuals with this disorder.
Despite decades of study, the specific pathophysiology of schizophrenia and all of its varied
symptoms remain elusive. However, recent advances in fields such as neuroimaging and
neurochemical imaging have allowed for prominent pathophysiological theories to be
experimentally tested.

1.1. The Original Dopamine Hypothesis
The dopamine hypothesis, for example, is one of the longest held theories of
schizophrenia origin and was developed after the discovery of antipsychotic drugs (see Howes
& Kapur, 2009 for a review). These drugs were found to reduce dopamine concentrations in the
brain by increasing the metabolism of dopamine or blocking its reuptake. The original dopamine
hypothesis suggested that excess transmission at dopamine receptors led to psychotic
symptoms, and blockade, by antipsychotic drugs, could resolve these symptoms. While this was
a first step to understanding the mechanisms underlying the clinical expression of schizophrenia,
this hypothesis did not directly address the relationship between dopamine transmission and
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neurodevelopmental deficits, the role that genetics played, what brain region was associated
with disorder, or what way this disruption influences positive and negative symptoms of
schizophrenia. It also did not connect the relationship between cognitive deficits associated with
the disorder and the proposed etiological mechanism.

1.2. The Revised Dopamine Hypothesis
The revised dopamine hypotheses, put forth by Davis et al. (1991), was motivated by
new evidence from postmortem and metabolite findings, imaging data, and animal work. This
evidence called into question the somewhat simple mechanism of illness posited by the original
dopamine hypothesis – that schizophrenia resulted from excess dopamine – and added
specificity to the original hypotheses by suggesting that schizophrenia resulted from prefrontal
hypodopaminergia related to a hypoactive mesocortical dopamine system, and subcortical
hyperdopaminergia related to a hyperactive mesolimbic dopamine system (Davis et al., 1991).
At the time this hypothesis was driven by evidence suggesting that dopamine function could
vary by brain region, by findings from PET studies showing reduced cerebral blood flow in the
frontal cortex, and from animal studies that provided evidence linking prefrontal dopamine
function to striatal dopamine tone. The revised dopamine hypothesis also linked symptom
expression to cortical and subcortical dopamine dysregulation, suggesting that the positive
symptoms of schizophrenia resulted from striatal hyperdopaminergia and negative symptoms
were more associated with frontal hypodopaminergia, as the mesocortical system has been
implicated in regulating both cognition and motivation (see Cools, 2008 for a review).
Interestingly, the mechanisms that regulate dopamine tone in these regions are not unrelated.
Abi-Dargham (2004) discussed mechanisms that regulate dopamine transmission, stating that
disruptions in glutamatergic neurotransmission could have exaggerated excitatory effects on
dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) while understimulating dopamine
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neurons in the mesocortical dopaminergic pathway leading to cortical hypodopaminergia.
Understimulation of D1 neurons in the cortex may reduce its inhibitory effect on subcortical
dopamine, thereby contributing to subcortical hyperdopaminergia.

1.2.1. The Revised Dopamine Hypothesis: Relationship to Cognitive Deficits
The revised dopamine hypothesis also provided a mechanism that could possibly
explain the type of cognitive impairment displayed by individuals with schizophrenia. A
substantial amount of evidence from neuropsychological studies of patients with PFC lesions
studies and electrophysiology studies of primates, and later neuroimaging studies of humans,
have shown that the frontal cortex plays an important role in cognitive domains like executive
functioning and working memory (Goldman-Rakic, 1995). Patients with schizophrenia have
shown deficits in these same domains, though deficits in individuals with schizophrenia broaden
to other domains that include processing speed, learning, and episodic memory (Dickinson,
Ragland, Gold, & Gur, 2008; Reichenberg & Harvey, 2007). One common denominator for
many of these tasks may be the requirement of executive control, which is necessary to guide,
coordinate, and update behavior flexibly. Given the importance of the PFC in cognitive control
processes like updating information, protecting against irrelevant information, and shifting from
one information set to another (Linden, 2007), understanding the nature of prefrontal
dysfunction during cognition has clear relevance for understanding performance deficits
associated with schizophrenia. A recent meta-analysis of imaging data of patients with
schizophrenia performing working memory and cognitive control tasks generally found evidence
for reduced prefrontal engagement (Minzenberg, Laird, Thelen, Carter, & Glahn, 2009), which is
consistent with the notion of hypofrontality. Another such meta-analysis did not find consistent
evidence supporting hypofrontality of schizophrenia patients during working memory processing,
nor did it find evidence supporting hyperfrontality (Van Snellenberg, Torres, & Thornton, 2006).
Rather, this study found that prefrontal activation during working memory performance of
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patients with schizophrenia varied across studies, demonstrating both increased activity and
decreased activity compared to controls, and this activity was found to be moderated by the
magnitude of performance differences between patients and controls (Van Snellenberg et al.,
2006).
While the revised dopamine hypothesis was a step forward in conceptualizing
schizophrenia etiology, it was not without its limitations. For example, many tenets of the
hypothesis were based on animal research, as there was scant direct or indirect evidence in
humans demonstrating low dopamine levels in the frontal cortex. Further, few studies at that
time had demonstrated evidence of elevated dopaminergic striatal function in humans (recent
studies, as discussed below, have provided some evidence for striatal dopamine dysregulation).
However, it was influential for providing information about the locus of neural dysfunction and
their relationship to symptom dysfunction.

1.3. The Second Revision of the Dopamine Hypothesis
Recently, a second revision of the dopamine hypothesis, proposed by Howes et al.
(2009), shifted focus slightly from previous versions. It proposes, like previous theories, that
striatal dopamine dysregulation is associated with psychosis in schizophrenia, but that a number
of factors contribute to this dysregulation (for example, stress, drug use, genetics, frontotemporal dysfunction, etc). Further, dopamine dysregulation associated with psychosis does not
appear to be well explained by differences of dopamine transporters or D2 type dopamine
receptors availability, given that differences between patients and controls are inconsistently
found and are of small effect (Howes et al., 2012). Instead, this recent revision to the dopamine
hypothesis suggests that the locus of striatal dopamine dysregulation lies with presynaptic
dopaminergic control, which impacts baseline synaptic dopamine levels, dopamine release, and
dopamine synthesis capacity. Positron emission tomography (PET) studies examining
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differences in dopamine synthesis capacity typically use radiolabeled-l-dihydroxyphenylalanine
(L-DOPA), which is converted to dopamine and stored in presynaptic vesicles for release (see
2006 for a review). A recent meta-analysis examining 618 patients with schizophrenia and 606
controls, taken from 44 studies, demonstrated a highly significant elevation in presynaptic
dopamine functioning in patients with a large effect size (Cohen d=0.79; Howes et al., 2012).
This pattern was true even when excluding studies with patients receiving antipsychotic
medication. At least one study of patients with schizophrenia has localized the dopamine
synthesis capacity abnormality to the associative striatum, particularly the precommissural
dorsal caudate (Kegeles et al., 2010).
A number of studies over the past few years have provided robust support for the idea
that presynaptic dopamine levels and dopamine release are associated specifically with
psychotic symptoms and with antipsychotic use efficacy. For example, studies have found that
dopamine synthesis capacity within the striatum is elevated for individuals who are at ultra-high
risk for developing psychosis, that within the striatum increased synthesis capacity is localized
to the associative striatum (Egerton et al., 2013; Howes et al., 2009), and capacity is positively
correlated with the severity of prodromal symptomology but not with the severity of anxiety or
depressive symptoms (Howes et al., 2009). There is evidence suggesting that dopamine
synthesis capacity in the associative striatum may be able to predict the onset of psychosis,
even amongst those individuals deemed to be at high risk for developing the disorder. Howes et
al. (2011) assessed dopamine synthesis capacity of healthy participants and participants who
were at ultra-high risk for psychosis, and then followed up with these participants 3 years later.
Diagnostic interviews were done to determine who amongst the ultra-high risk group when on to
develop a psychotic disorder. Subjects were then divided into three groups: healthy participants,
those who were at high-risk for developing psychosis but did not transition, and those who were
at high-risk for developing psychosis and did transition. The study found that participants who
went on to transition to psychosis had significantly greater dopamine synthesis capacity within
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the associative striatum than both the healthy and high-risk non-transition groups (Howes et al.,
2011). Dopamine synthesis capacity may also be able to predict which patients with
schizophrenia will respond to antipsychotic medication from those who will be treatment
resistant (Demjaha, Murray, McGuire, Kapur, & Howes, 2012), such that patients to respond to
medication have significantly greater dopamine synthesis capacity than patients who do not and
well controls. While patients who are resistant to antipsychotic medication intervention may not
show differences of dopamine synthesis capacity when compared with controls and patients
who do respond to medication use, there is some early evidence to suggest that treatment
resistant patients may have increased glutamate levels, particularly within the anterior cingulate
(Demjaha et al., 2014)
The second revision of the dopamine hypothesis also de-emphasizes the role that the
prefrontal cortex has on symptom expression, as the evidence supporting prefrontal
hypodopaminergia is inconclusive. For example, dopamine transmission in the prefrontal cortex
is mainly mediated by D1 receptors. While D1 dysfunction has been linked to cognitive
dysfunction and negative symptoms in schizophrenia (Goldman-Rakic, Castner, Svensson,
Siever, & Williams, 2004), studies examining the relationship between D1 receptor levels,
schizophrenia symptoms, and cognition have either found no difference between patients and
controls (Karlsson, Farde, Halldin, & Sedvall, 2002), decreased receptor density (Okubo et al.,
1997), or increased D1 receptor density (Abi-Dargham et al., 2002; Berridge, 2007). Given
these inconsistent results, the second revision focuses its attention on presynaptic dopamine as
a mechanism leading to striatal dopaminergic dysregulation in schizophrenia.

1.3.1. Motivational Incentive Salience and Schizophrenia
The second revision of the dopamine hypothesis goes on to link its neurochemical
hypothesis with the clinical phenomena of schizophrenia by considering the motivational
incentive salience literature. The motivational salience hypothesis suggests that dopamine
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mediates the conversion of an external stimulus from a neutral representation into one that is
attractive or aversive (Berridge & Robinson, 1998). In addition to motivational salience there are
other competing theories that describe the causal contribution mesolimbic dopamine activity has
on reward and motivation, including theories of hedonia or ‘liking’ as well as learning and reward
prediction theories (Berridge, 2007). Berridge (2007) reviewed these theories and the evidence
to support them and suggested that, given the evidence, dopamine is not necessary for
experiencing hedonia or for learning via prediction signals (Berridge, 2007). However, of the
three theories dopamine was necessary to produce ‘wanting’ and dopamine activation was
sufficient to assign incentive salience to external, neutral, stimuli (Berridge, 2007). While this
argument suggests that, with regard to reward and motivation, dopamine may be more
important for motivational incentive salience, it does not suggest that dopamine is unimportant
for hedonics and learning. Rather, it suggests that the role of dopamine in the attribution of
salience provides an interface where hedonics, reward prediction, and learning mechanisms
allow for an organism to focus its efforts on what it determines to be valuable and facilitates
motivational drives to action. The importance of dopamine for “wanting” or incentive salience is
discussed in a review by Palmiter (2008), in which he examines the literature of genetically
engineered mice that lack tyrosine hydroxylase (responsible for catalyzing the conversion of Ltyrosine to L-DOPA, precursor to dopamine) in all dopaminergic neurons. These mice, he
observes, become hypoactive and aphagic (refusal to swallow), and starve by the time that they
reach 4 weeks of age. Mice that are dopamine-depleted are not motivated to engage in goaldirected behaviors, but still have a preference for rewarding foods, like sucrose, and can still
learn from conditioning. Restoring dopamine selectively in the dorsal striatum is sufficient to
allow feeding, locomotion, and it appears to restore motivation to engage in goal-directed
behaviors.
Under normal circumstances, dopamine mediates the acquisition of motivational
salience assignment in response to a stimulus based on a person’s experience or preference,
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but it does not create this process independent of stimulus. In psychosis, however, the revised
dopamine hypothesis suggests that dysregulated dopamine transmission leads to stimulusindependent release of dopamine, which then leads to aberrant salience assignment to external
stimuli as well as internal representations (Kapur, 2003). As such, this hypothesis proposes that
dysregulated dopamine release contributes directly to the formation of delusional symptoms via
inappropriate attribution of salience to “neutral” events in the environment. More specifically,
the psychotic experience is thought to evolve in stages, where initially an individual with
schizophrenia may simply have a heightened “awareness”, where previously irrelevant stimuli in
the environment become relevant. Subsequently, these individuals may feel driven to act on
and/or explain the newly relevant phenomenon (G. Roberts, 1992) at which point a top-down
cognitive explanation is imposed. Over time, the delusional framework is created. With
hallucinations a similar process may take place but with the initial aberrant salient experience
being internal representations – internal thoughts, guilt, etc (Kapur, 2003). This recent revision
to the dopamine hypothesis does describe how incentive salience models might explain
negative symptoms, suggesting that dopamine dysregulation diminishes reward signals thereby
producing symptoms like anergia and anhedonia in a similar way that dopamine depletion
affects mice, but Kapur (2003) suggests that incentive models may be more appropriate for
explaining positive symptoms.

1.3.2. Studies Examining Aberrant Incentive Salience and Schizophrenia
The formation and expression of aberrant salience assignment is thought to involve the
dorsal and ventral striatum, which receives inputs dopaminergic inputs from the substantia nigra
and VTA, respectively. As discussed above, glutamatergic projections from the PFC, amongst
other regions, to the VTA also influence dopaminergic input to the ventral stratum. Few studies
have examined the relationship between aberrant incentive salience, schizophrenia symptom
expression, and brain functioning. Studies of healthy participants have shown that the ventral
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striatum plays an important role in associative learning, where participants learn to associate
relevance to a neutral stimulus after repeated paring with an unconditioned stimulus, using both
appetitive and aversive stimuli (McClure & Lieberman, 2003; O'Doherty, Dayan, Friston,
Critchley, & Dolan, 2003). For patients with schizophrenia there is behavioral evidence
suggesting they exhibit aberrant salience when performing a salience attribution test, which was
particularly evident in patients with delusions (Roiser et al., 2009), and there is neuroimaging
evidence that this aberrant salience assignment is associated with activity in the ventral striatum
in both medicated (Jensen et al., 2008) and unmedicated (Esslinger et al., 2012) patient
populations. Thus, there is evidence that 1) patients with schizophrenia, thought to have
dysregulated dopaminergic activity, demonstrate aberrant salience assignment behaviorally;
and 2) that this aberrant salience assignment is associated with activity in the ventral striatum.
However, a number of studies suggest that the locus of the major dopamine abnormality of
patients with schizophrenia compared to controls is in the dorsal striatum. What, then, is the
relationship between dysregulated dopamine, aberrant salience, and dorsal striatal functioning?
Moreover, is there are relationship between aberrant salience, dorsal striatal functioning, and
other symptoms of schizophrenia like deficits of cognition?

1.4. Cognitive Control and Schizophrenia: Background
While patients with schizophrenia display cognitive deficits in a variety of domains, it
may be the case that a common denominator for these deficits is impaired cognitive control. In
fact, areas of relative cognitive strengths in schizophrenia are in tasks or domains that are not
dependent on executive control. For example, meta-analytic studies have shown that effect size
differences on tasks of simple attention are smaller than those of complex working memory
tasks and executive functioning tasks (Dickinson et al., 2007; Reichenberg & Harvey, 2007).
Further, a meta-analysis of a canonical task of executive control (the Wisconsin Card Sorting
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Task; WCST) has shown that patients with schizophrenia are severely impaired (Dickinson,
Ramsey, & Gold, 2007) and that their performance distinguishes them not only from controls,
but other psychiatric groups as well (Johnson-Selfridge & Zalewski, 2001).
Cognitive control is thought to be a critical aspect of cognition as it allows for goal related
information to be selected for maintenance and maintained, protected against interference, and
updated when appropriate (Braver & Cohen, 2000; J. D. Cohen, Braver, & O'Reilly, 1996;
Norman & Shallice, 2000; Oberauer, 2009; Randall & Munakata, 2000). This goal directed
behavior might depend upon reward signals that have a neuromodulatory effect on neural
processing in the prefrontal cortex (Braver & Cohen, 2000). Theoretical models of cognitive
control dysfunction in schizophrenia (e.g. Braver, Barch, & Cohen, 1999) have suggested that
disrupted dopaminergic signaling associated with schizophrenia interfere with a gating
mechanism that facilitates the control of information during cognitive control. More specifically,
Braver et al. (1999) suggest that dopamine activity signals the presence of goal relevant
information, which allows this information to be updated or gated into active memory, and
dysregulated dopamine signaling can disrupt the control of information gated into active memory
as well as the protection of maintained information against irrelevant information. One problem
with theories that propose updating of prefrontal information representations via direct
mesocortical dopamine input is that this signal updates the PFC globally, which would make
selective updating of prefrontal information representations difficult. Another indirect route by
which dopaminergic signals may impact prefrontal control processing is through
nondopaminergic inputs (e.g. basal ganglia-thalamocortical loops). One theory, originally
proposed by Frank et al. (2001) addresses the global dopamine updating problem by
suggesting that the basal ganglia, via guidance by dopaminergic inputs, may work to gate
information in specific areas of the cortex during cognitive control.

1.4.1. Basal Ganglia Involvement in Cognitive Control
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Frank et al. (2001) also proposes that cognitive control tasks, like working memory tasks,
require rapid updating, maintenance, interference control, and a mechanism of gating. This
model suggests that these processes are executed by an interaction between the basal ganglia
and the frontal cortex, such that the frontal cortex uses continuously firing activation to maintain
information over time and the basal ganglia fires only to trigger appropriate task related updating.
Further, this model assumes that separate memory representations are possible and are
represented via the striped micro-anatomy of the PFC (from Hazy, Frank, & O'Reilly, 2006).
These stripes are characterized by small groups of interconnected neurons somewhat isolated
from one another, which may protect them from interference from representations in nearby
stripes. According to the model selective updating is accomplished via independent, updatable
parallel loops known to exist in between the basal ganglia and the PFC (Middleton & Strick,
1994) that are selective to anatomical stripes in the PFC. By incorporating the stripe-based
gating architecture this model attempts to address the global updating problem of other
dopamine-based gating models.
The mechanisms that allow gating to occur in the Frank (2001) model are considered an
evolutionary extension of the same mechanisms involved in the motor control system: the direct
and indirect pathways (Hazy, Frank, & O'Reilly, 2007; Smith, Bevan, Shink, & Bolam, 1998). In
the motor domain, learned action history shapes reward signaling to the basal ganglia, which
then inhibits or disinhibits frontal motor representations to allow an action to occur and to inhibit
unwanted actions. Neurons in the direct pathway, or the Go pathway, and the indirect pathway,
or the NoGo pathway, originate in the caudate. The Go pathway is sensitive to D1 receptor
stimulation and the NoGo pathway is sensitive to D2 receptor stimulation. When neurons in the
Go pathway fire they inhibit the substantia nigra pars reticulate (SNr), which inhibits the
thalamus, when then releases regions of the cortex from its tonic inhibition. When neurons in
the NoGo pathway are tonically active, and inhibit the globus palladus, which disinhibits the SNr,
and thus allows for tonic inhibition of the cortex via the thalamus. Increased activity of the Go
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pathway is associated with facilitation of movement and increased activity of the NoGo pathway
is associated with the inhibition of movement (Smith et al., 1998). Disorders of motor
dysfunction, like Parkinson’s, are the result of an imbalance of Go and NoGo pathway activity,
where a depletion of dopamine in the striatum diminishes Go pathway activity and impairs
movement initiation. Similarly, these pathways may inhibit and disinhibit regions of the frontal
cortex responsible for representing target information necessary to mediate cognitive control
demands. That is, Go pathway signals that are triggered by increases in dopamine in response
to target stimuli and this Go activity facilitates information updating in the cortex. NoGo activity,
on the other hand, is tonically active and facilitates the maintenance of information over time.
Further, the model predicts that recurrent maintenance processes in the prefrontal cortex will
demonstrate transient activity when a task irrelevant distractor is presented, but regions in the
basal ganglia will not activate because the distractor fails to initiate an update signal (also see
Gruber, Dayan, Gutkin, & Solla, 2006). Thus, according to the model, during the execution of
updating task relevant information one would expect to see “Go” activity in both the striatum and
the frontal cortex, but during the presentation of task irrelevant distracters, a “NoGo” condition,
one would not expect to see increased activity in the striatum but transient activity in the
prefrontal cortex.
Interestingly, few studies have explicitly examined the role of the striatum during
updating task performance. Updating is thought to be an important part of executive functioning
(Miyake et al., 2000; Oberauer, 2009) and can be described as the overwriting of active memory
representations with new, task relevant information. It is a construct that has been shown to be
separable from other cognitive constructs associated with executive functioning. For example,
Miyake (2000) used a latent variable analysis and found that performance on updating tasks
were dissociable from performance on tasks that required shifting between mental sets, or tasks
that required the inhibition of proponent processes. Given the apparent construct validity for
these updating tasks Collette et al. (2007) conducted a functional imaging study to identify
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regions of the brain that activated similarly during updating processing. By adapting updating
tasks from the Miyake (2000) study and using conjunction analysis they found a large cerebral
network including the left frontopolar region and left middle frontal gyrus was common to the
different updating tasks used in the study, although activation in some regions was more
specific to the particular task used. They did not find basal ganglia involvement during updating
task performance. However, because such a large number of cerebral areas were involved in
updating they concluded that the unitary nature of the updating construct may be questionable.
Alternatively, they note that in addition to updating the tasks that were used in the study
required encoding, the maintenance of information, sequencing, and a response. As such, using
an updating task that attempts to separate these processes may better capture brain activity
associated with updating processing.
A study by Roth et al. (2006) used a visual updating task that was designed to separate
maintenance activity from updating activity. They used a mixed-event blocked design and
deconvolution analysis to estimate time courses, and also found that a distributed network of
regions was associated with updating (greater activity during updating than during maintenance
activity). Included within this network of regions was a region in the left lateral dorsal striatum.
While this study provided some support for the involvement of the basal ganglia in updating, a
number of other regions also showed similar patterns of activity (e.g. middle frontal gyrus) and
there was no evidence to suggest that one region contributed differently to update processing
than another.
Another study by McNab & Klingberg (2008) investigated the neural basis for accessing
control to working memory storage. Their results were consistent with the idea that an
individual’s working memory capacity is determined by their ability to selectively filter irrelevant
distracters, as they found that middle frontal gyrus and globus pallidus activity were significant
predictors of working memory capacity, and globus pallidus activity was negatively correlated
with distracter storage. That is, they suggest that globus pallidus activity actively filters
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distracting information, thus freeing up working memory capacity. As globus pallidus activity
decreases the number of distracting items stored increases. They suggest that the globus
pallidus functions as a filter mechanism for working memory, however their results did not
extend to the dorsal striatum.
To better examine the dynamic activations between the cortex and the basal ganglia
during cognitive control, a study would need to utilize a single task that not only incorporates
important component processes of cognitive control, but one that also isolates these elements
from one another. Such a task was used in my prior work (Ceaser et al., in prep). In this
previous study we used an event-related imaging design to isolate task events in time as well as
a novel task of updating that separately examined updating, interference control (the protection
of stored information against task irrelevant information), and simple maintenance. We found a
dissociation between subcortical and cortical regions of the brain during updating and
interference control, such that both cortical and subcortical regions displayed robust updating
activity, but only cortical regions demonstrated increased activity when compared to a “do
nothing” condition. The striatal regions that showed a main effect of condition (the conditions
being update, interference control, and simple maintenance) and an interaction of condition by
time (specifically, the time window encompassing the presentation of an update cue and a 7
second delay prior to the presentation of a probe) were almost entirely left lateral, and with the
exception of one region in the caudate were all dorsal caudate or dorsal caudal putamen (dorsal
were those with a z > 2 and caudal regions were those with a y > 0). This finding suggests while
both cortical and subcortical regions are involved in updating processing, the patterns of activity
in frontal cortex and striatum are dissociable, and are generally consistent with the pattern of
effects one would predict from the Frank (2001) model.

1.5. Aberrant Salience and Cognitive Control: Proposed Study
While there is consistent evidence suggesting that the dorsal striatum is the locus of the
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largest dopamine abnormality for patients with schizophrenia, evidence suggesting that this
disruption of striatal functioning may lead to aberrant salience assignment, and some evidence
suggesting the striatum may function as a cognitive gating mechanism that is likely dependent
upon well regulated dopaminergic signaling, few studies if any have found a relationship
between these findings. Thus, the question remains: Is there are relationship between aberrant
salience, dorsal striatal functioning, and other symptoms of schizophrenia like deficits of
cognition? Like other models describing the mechanisms of cognitive control impairment in
schizophrenia (Braver & Cohen, 1999), the Frank model also predicts that dysregulated
dopamine will disrupt the gating signal, in this case Go signal activity, and lead to impaired
cognitive control. Dopamine dysfunction could cause the inappropriate updating of task
irrelevant information (inappropriate Go signaling), or weaken maintenance signaling (disrupted
NoGo signaling) for patients with schizophrenia. Both impairments could lead to increased
distractor susceptibility for patients. If, given our previous work (Ceaser et al., in prep), the basal
ganglia are selectively involved in updating we predict that patients, who have dysregulated
striatal dopamine signaling, demonstrate increased activity compared to controls when
presented with task irrelevant distractors. Further, it may also be the case that there is a
relationship between aberrant salience assignment, thought to be associated with positive
symptoms of schizophrenia like delusions and hallucinations, and disrupted cognitive control
gating that leads to performance deficits during distractor resistance. In fact, evidence for this is
provided by a recent study by Morris et al. (2012), who found that positive symptoms scores of
schizophrenia were related to learned irrelevance, and that even within the patient group high
positive symptom patients were significantly worse at ignoring irrelevant information than low
positive symptom patients. One difficulty with linking impaired cognitive control to impaired
subcortical DA function and aberrant salience in schizophrenia is that the majority of prior
studies examining cognitive functioning in schizophrenia have not found a relationship to global
measures of positive symptoms (Breier, Schreiber, Dyer, & Pickar, 1991; Nuechterlein et al.,
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2011; Ventura, Hellemann, Thames, Koellner, & Nuechterlein, 2009). However, few studies
have specifically examined the relationship between specific subcomponents of cognitive
control and the specific aspects of positive symptoms that the second revision of the dopamine
hypothesis would predict to be related to abnormal (i.e. aberrant salience).
Using a novel task that is specifically designed to better isolate different aspects of
cognitive control (e.g. updating, maintenance, and interference control), we will test whether or
not patients demonstrate disrupted basal ganglia activity compared with controls during
cognitive control performance, and determine whether or not these disruptions in brain activity
are associated with particular aspects of behavioral performance as well as clinical symptoms of
schizophrenia, specifically aberrant salience, delusions, and hallucinations.

1.6. Specific Aims
Specific Aim 1: Test the hypothesis that individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate
dysregulated striatal activity during updating and interference control and that striatal
activity predicts performance deficits. Using a novel task of cognitive control and functional
magnetic imaging, I will scan both patients and controls to examine cortical and subcortical
brain activity changes during task performance. Given evidence that patients with schizophrenia
have dysregulated dopamine activity in the striatum I predict that individuals with schizophrenia
will show: 1) reduced striatal signal during updating which will be associated with poorer
updating performance; and 2) increased striatal activity during the presentation of irrelevant
distractors, which will be associated with poorer distracter resistance.
Specific Aim 2: Test the hypothesis that in individuals with schizophrenia, increased
striatal activity during distracter presentation will be positively associated with aberrant
salience symptoms, delusions, and hallucinations of patients with schizophrenia. Using a
variety of clinical tools to assess schizophrenia symptomology (including the Scale for the
Assessment of Negative Symptoms, SANS; the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms,
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SAPS; and the Aberrant Salience Inventory, ASI) I will examine the relationship between
symptom scores and striatal activity during distracter presentation. Symptom scores of
delusions and hallucinations will be obtained from the SAPS. The ASI will be used to assess
overall aberrant symptom salience. I predict that increased striatal activity will be associated
with increased symptom severity of delusions, hallucinations, and the index of aberrant salience
from the ASI. Further, increased symptom severity will be associated with increased intrusion
errors during distractor presentation.

2. Methods
Participants were recruited through the Conte Center for the Neuroscience of Mental
Disorders (CCNMD) at Washington University in St. Louis. We recruited 56 participants (30
individuals with schizophrenia and 26 healthy controls). Of those participants, 4 were excluded
from data analysis because of excessive head movement while in the scanner, 9 were excluded
for not completing both phases of the study, and 1 healthy control was excluded because of
aberrant behavioral performance (determined by mahalnobis distance, described below). This
left us with 22 participants in the patient group and 20 participants in the healthy control group.
Patients were diagnosed using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-IV; First,
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002). These interviews were conducted by a master’s-level
clinician, who completed SCID-IV training and participated in regular diagnostic training
sessions as part of the CCNMD. Controls were given a Mini-International Neuropsychiatric
Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998) to determine the presence of a history of mental illness.
Exclusion criteria for controls included a lifetime history of any psychiatric disorder and having a
first-degree relative with a psychotic disorder. Participants in either group were excluded if they
met criteria for substance abuse or dependence within the past 6 months, have a clinically
unstable or severe medical disorder, a medical disorder that would confound the assessment of
psychiatric diagnosis or render research participation dangerous, had head trauma with loss of
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consciousness, or met DSM-IV criteria for mental retardation. Patients were stable on
antipsychotic medication doses for at least 2 weeks before participating in the study.
All participants were given the Vocabulary and Matrix reasoning subtests from the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997) to assess both
verbal and non-verbal intelligence. Socioeconomic status was assessed by asking participants
two open-ended questions for each parent about what the parent currently does and what they
did for a living most of their life. Parental education was assessed by asking participants openended questions about the highest level of education each parent attained. The answers were
classified using a scale similar to the British Registrar General’s social classification of
occupations where occupations range from 0 (low occupational status) to 45 (high occupational
status). Given that disease progression and cognitive disturbances associated with
schizophrenia risk may impair educational attainment and achievement we focused on parental
socioeconomic status and parental education as they may be a more appropriate way to assess
developmental exposure to educational opportunities that could influence cognitive function
(Resnick SM, 1992).

2.1. Clinical Rating Scales
We conducted assessments of the current level of clinical expression in both patients
and controls. Clinical symptoms of patients were assessed using the Scale for the Assessment
of Negative Symptoms (SANS; Andreasen, 1983) and the Scale for the Assessment of Positive
Symptoms (SAPS; Andreasen, 1984). These assessments were conducted by a master’s-level
clinician. All participants also completed the Chapman Psychosis Proneness Scales (L. J.
Chapman, Edell, & Chapman, 1980), which included the Perceptual Aberration Scale, the
Magical Ideation Scale, the Physical Anhedonia Scale, and the Social Anhedonia Scale.
We assessed aberrant salience specifically using the Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI).
The ASI was developed to asses the unusual or inappropriate assignment of salience,
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significance, or importance to non-salient stimuli (Cicero, Kerns, & McCarthy, 2010). It consists
of 29 items created to capture the phenomenological descriptions of the initial experience of
psychosis in the literature (Kapur, 2003; Parnas, Handest, Saebye, & Jansson, 2003). Items for
the ASI were generated by Cicero et al. (2010) based on the phenomenological descriptions of
the initial experience of psychosis in the literature, descriptions of the prodromal phase of
schizophrenia, and transcripts of interviews of people with schizophrenia. Cicero et al. (2010)
found that the ASI was strongly, positively correlated with scales assessing psychotic-like
experiences, including magical ideation and perceptual aberration, and other scales measuring
psychosis-proneness. The ASI was also found to be positively correlated with social anhedonia,
but the correlation was weaker than the correlation between ASI and other scales assessing
psychoisis-proneness. The weaker relationship between ASI and anhedonia was predicted
given previous work demonstrating a weaker relationship between psychosis-proneness and
social anhedonia (Kwapil, 1998). Further, the ASI was found to be elevated in healthy
individuals with elevated psychosis proneness as well as participants with a history of psychosis,
even when comparing them with a psychiatric comparison group (Cicero et al., 2010). The utility
of the ASI, compared to other scales measuring psychosis proneness, is in its specificity. While
other scales, including magical ideation and perceptual aberration (CHAPMAN), the Structured
Interview for Prodromal Syndromes (SIPS; Kwapil, 1998), and the Schizotypal Personality
Questionnnaire (SPQ; Raine, 1991), contain items that are similar to aberrant salience there are
other items that may tap into constructs that are related, but peripheral to the core construct of
aberrant salience.

2.2. Task Design and Stimuli
While in the scanner subjects completed a modified Sternberg-type delayed match-tosample working memory task. The task contains a two-item working memory load consisting of
two complex geometric shapes (Attneave & Arnoult, 1956) that were generated using a Matlab
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algorithm (Collin & McMullen, 2002). These stimuli were chosen because they may be more
difficult to encode than words or numbers, and thus we hoped to restrict encoding strategies
used by subjects. By doing so we hoped that the level of difficulty for both patient and control
groups would be more comparable, as individuals with schizophrenia and controls would be less
likely to spontaneously engage in such verbal maintenance strategies. The shapes were white
on a black background and each trial of the task consisted of three distinct, temporally isolated,
periods: memory set presentation, update cue presentation, and probe presentation (see Figure
2.1). During the memory set participants were presented with two shapes, one after another,
framed in a blue box. The shapes were presented for 1.5 seconds each. Participants were
asked to memorize these shapes in the order that they were presented. After the second shape
participants saw a fixation cross in the center of the screen that was presented for 7 seconds.
Participants were instructed to focus on the cross while maintaining the previously presented
items (Delay 1 in Figure 2.1). After the first delay participants were presented with the update
cue items: 2 green or red boxes presented one after another for approximately 1.5 seconds
each. If the boxes were green (an Upgreen trial, part A in Figure 2.1) and a shape appeared in
one or both of the boxes, participants were asked to replace the original shape that appeared in
that position (the first or second shape that was framed in blue during memory set presentation).
During an Upgreen trial participants made either a partial (one shape, either in the first or
second position) or a whole update of the original shapes presented during the memory set. If
the boxes were red (a Upred trial; part B in Figure 2.1) participants were asked to ignore any
new shapes that were presented and continue remembering the original shapes framed in blue.
If, during the update cue, both boxes were empty (an Upempty trail; part C in Figure 2.1)
participants were not required to do anything but maintain the original shapes of the memory set
that were framed in blue. Boxes during Upempty trials could be either red or green. Because no
new shape was presented participants were instructed that the color of the boxes was irrelevant.
At the presentation of the probe, participants were presented with one shape, the word
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“Correct?” appeared at the top of the screen, and at the bottom the word “Yes” appeared on the
right and the word “No” appeared on the left. Participants were asked to make a button press if
the shape that was presented matched one of the two shapes that they were currently
remembering. There were a total of 120 trials used in the task (52 Upgreen, 48 Upred, and 20
Upempty; Appendix Table F). A number of differing probe types were used in the task to capture
a variety of errors that an individual could make during task performance. For example, during
Upgreen trials the participant was probed with probed with the item they should have updated.
This trial was called an “Update” trial. A correct response indicates that an appropriate update
was made and that the new information was encoded into memory. There were a total of 20
Update trials. Another Upgreen probe we used was called a “Resist Maintenance” trial, and
participants were probed with the shape in the original memory set that should have been
replaced by the new item during the update cue. A correct rejection of this shape indicates that
the subject rejected this item as one of the two correct shapes, but a response of “yes” to this
items suggests that the participant incorrectly maintained this item in the target set. This type of
trial is called a Resist Maintenance trial because participants must resist maintaining this shape
when they were being asked to replace it during the update cue. There were a total of 20 Resist
Maintenance trials. For trials where the participant was asked to ignore information (Upred), we
probed participants with one shape from the original memory set. A correct response on this trial
type suggests that the participant was able to maintain information even when presented with
task relevant distracters during the update cue period. These trials are called “Resist Distracter”
trials and there were 20 of these trials during the task. Another probe type that was used during
Upred trials involved participants being probed with a shape that they were asked to ignore
during the update cue. These trials are called “Resist Distracter Lure” trials and there were also
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Figure 2. 1 Controlled Update Task Design
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20 trials of this type in the task. A correct response during this trial type indicates that a
participant correctly rejected a shape that did not match one of the to-be-remembered shapes.
An incorrect response on this trial type suggests that the participant inappropriately encoded
this shape into memory. Dysregulated salience assignment may lead to increased errors on this
trial type, as task information designated as irrelevant may be inappropriately assigned some
relevance. Finally, for Upempty trials participants were probed with an item from the original
memory set. There were 14 of these trials and they are called “Maintenance” trials. A correct
response indicates that the participant correctly maintained this information over the course of
the trial. In addition to the probes used in the above mentioned trials participants were probed
with shapes that were not presented previously. These trials are called “Novel Probe” trials (26
trials of this type) and were included to ensure that participants could reject probes that were
obviously incorrect, and thus these trials gave us a measure of how well participants understood
the task’s instructions.

2.3. fMRI Acquisition
Structural and blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) data was acquired with a 3T Tim
TRIO scanner (Siemens, Malvern, Pennsylvania) at Washington University. Stimuli were
projected behind the scanner, visible through a mirror above the eyes. Subjects completed 120
task trials over the course of 10 bold runs. The various trial types were, to the extent possible,
evenly interspersed within the 10 runs. Twelve trials occurred in each run. Each trial lasted 35
seconds (Figure 2.1). Functional images were acquired using a gradient echo echo-planar
sequence maximally sensitive to BOLD contrast (T2*) (repetition time [TR] = 2000 ms, echo
time [TE] = 27 ms, field of view [FOV] = 256 mm, flip = 90°, voxel size = 4 mm3). Subjects
completed a 7.38- minute BOLD run comprised of 210 volumes containing oblique axial images
(35 slices per volume) which was acquired parallel to the anterior-posterior commissure.
Structural images were acquired using a sagittal MP-RAGE 3D T1-weighted sequence (TR =
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2400 ms, TE = 3.16 ms, flip = 8°; voxel size = 1 x 1 x 1 mm).
Preprocessing included: 1) Slice-time correction, 2) Removal of first 5 images from each
run to reach steady state, 3) Elimination of odd/even slice intensity differences given
interpolated acquisition, 4) Rigid body motion correction (Ojemann et al., 1997), 5) Intensity
normalization to a whole-brain mode value of 1,000 without bias or gain field correction, 6)
Registration using a 12-parameter affine transform of the structural image to a template image
in the Talairach coordinate system (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988), 7) Co- registration of fMRI
volumes to the structural image with 3 mm re-sampling (R. L. Buckner et al., 2004; Ojemann et
al., 1997), and 8) Smoothing using a 6 mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.

2.4. Quality Control
We compared the two groups on movement indices and SNR to determine whether
there were group differences in these factors that may be influencing group differences in fMRI
results. If there were, we confirmed the results of analyses below using subsets of patients and
controls matched for movement and SNR. We also used techniques discussed by Siegel et al.
(2013) to remove from GLM estimation volumes in which head motion exceeded a threshold
(0.5 mm of frame displacement). Participants who lost greater than 40% of the total number of
frames, or more than 84 of the 210 frames, were excluded from further analysis.

3. Data Analysis
3.1. Demographics and Behavioral Data
We conducted a Mahalanobis distance analysis on the task variables to identify
multivariate outlier values, or cases where an individual is responding differently compared to
other participants across multiple dimensions. Mahalanobis distance was calculated separately
for patients and control for accuracy (including trial types Maintenance, Resist Distracter, Resist
Distracter Lure, Update, and Resist Maintenance trials). The probability of distance values were
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computed separately for patient and control groups. Mahalanobis distance values were
assessed using χ2 (5, N = 43) = 11.07, p < 0.05), where values with a probability of less than
0.05 were determined to be outliers and were removed from further analyses.
Chi-squared tests were used for categorical variables (gender, ethnicity) to determine if
these distributions differed between groups. We conducted t-tests on age, education level,
parental education, symptom scores, and measures of IQ (standard scores of verbal and nonverbal IQ) to determine if these variables differed between diagnostic groups. Independent
Mann-Whitney U tests were done for variables that failed to demonstrate variance equality.
With regard to task data, because we were primarily interested the Update and Resist
Distracter Lure trials, we conduced at repeated measures ANOVA, with trial type (2 levels;
Update and Resist Distracter Lure trials) as the within subject factor and diagnosis (2 levels;
patients and controls) as the between subject factor. We were particularly interested in these
trials because behavioral accuracy is critically dependent on intact gating functioning. Planned
contrasts were done when appropriate to determine whether patient performance significantly
differed from controls. A secondary repeated measures ANOVA was done that included the
remaining task trials, with trial type (6 levels; Maintenance, Resist Distracter, Resist
Maintenance, and the 3 novel probe trial types) as the within subject factor and diagnosis (2
levels; patients and controls) as the between subject factor.

3.2. fMRI Data Analysis
3.2.1. Types of GLMS
We analyzed the fMRI task data in two ways, creating two sets of GLMs. The first set of
GLMs focused on the 3 events that occurred during the update cue of the trial. We refer to this
as the “Condition” analysis. For the Condition analysis all trial types were collapsed into three
events, ignoring the different probe types that could occur within a condition: 1) the update
condition (Upgreen) in which participants were required to make a update of information, 2) the

25

interference control condition (Upred) in which participants were required to ignore distracters,
and 3) the maintenance condition (Upempty) in which participants were not presented any
shape stimuli, and were simply required to maintain the items from the memory set. Analyses at
the level of Condition could reveal differences between groups when tasked with making an
update, ignoring distracters, or simply maintain information. A second way we analyzed the
fMRI task data was to take into account the different probe types within each task condition (i.e.
breaking the Upred condition into Resist Distracter, Resist Distracter Lure, and Resist Distracter
Novel Probe trial types). Breaking conditions up allowed us to examine brain activity associated
with specific errors of interference control, inappropriate updating errors for example (Resist
Distracter Lure trials), as apposed to a more general error of interference control (i.e. Upred
Condition trials). We refer to this as the “trial type” analysis. For each of these sets of GLMs,
we estimated task-related activity in each voxel for each subject without assuming a
hemodynamic response function (HRF) response (Ollinger, Corbetta, & Shulman, 2001). Fifteen
frames of each trial were estimated for correct and incorrect trials of separately, and the
resulting beta estimates of event-related responses at each trial time point were entered into
second-level analyses that treated subjects as a random factor.

3.2.2. Analysis Approach: Independently Defined ROIs versus Anatomical Mask
One approach we used to examine the effects of task Condition was to use ROIs
identified in a previous study of healthy controls using the same task paradigm to assess the
brain activity as a function of task condition (Ceaser et al., in prep). The results of this study
revealed patterns of brain activity in response to task conditions that differed between cortical
and subcortical brain regions. Using these independently defined ROIs allows us to enhance
statistical power to detect effects by restricting our analysis to only voxels within the previously
defined regions, but also to attempt to replicate our previous findings and to determine whether
activity in these regions went on to interact with diagnosis. These regions will be referred to as
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the independently defined ROIs in the results section. We considered a region to be significant
for this analyses if p<.05.
We were also specifically interested in whether regions in the prefrontal cortex and basal
ganglia, specifically the dorsal striatum, demonstrated condition effects. Thus, as a second
approach we used anatomical masks of the basal ganglia (Wang et al., 2008) and the prefrontal
cortex (Rajkowska & Goldman-Rakic, 1995), and examined voxel-wise analyses of brain activity
within these masks. These ROIs were combined into a single mask (see Appendix A for a
multislice image of the combined masks) and we used a small volume type I error correction,
implemented via the Analysis of Functional Neuroimages AlphaSim, of Z > 2.32, k = 20 voxels
for this combined ROI mask. This analysis could produce regions that show main effects of
condition and time, and a 2-way interaction of condition by time.

3.2.3. Replication of Prior Results in Healthy Individuals
To determine whether we could replicate findings from our previous study in the
Independently defined ROIs, we examined only the healthy participants in the current study and
conducted a repeated measures ANOVA at the region level with condition (3 levels; Upgreen,
Upred, and Upempty) and time (5 levels) as factors. The 5 TRs we used for this analysis
corresponded to the 5 TR following the presentation of the update cue (frames 8-12, accounting
for hemodynamic lag). Only correct trials were examined in this analysis. If an ROI
demonstrated either a significant effect of condition or an interaction of condition and time, we
then conducted follow-up analyses to determine the source of theses effect, with each analyses
comparing one condition to another. Separate ANOVAs were done for conditions Upgreen
versus Upempty and Upred versus Upempty.
Following the ROI analysis using previously defined regions, next conducted voxel-wise
analyses within our anatomical masks using only the controls to see if our previous results
would replicate. Specifically, we conducted voxel-wise repeated measures ANOVA with
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condition (3 levels; Upgreen, Upred, and Upempty) and time (15 levels) as factors. We included
all 15 frames of the trial in the analysis to capture regions that show effects of interest, but at
any time during the course of the trial. We then tested whether or not condition effects occurred
when we would expect them to during the update component of the trials. For any region
demonstrating an effect of condition or an interaction of condition and time, we followed up with
an analysis that focused on 5 frames that occurred after the presentation of the update cues
and prior to the response of the probe (frames 8-12, accounting for hemodynamic lag).
Specifically, we conduced a second repeated measures ANOVA at the region level with
condition (3 levels) and time (5 levels) as factors. We examined the source of any such effect in
the manner described above, by comparing Upgreen versus Upempty and Upred versus
Upempty separately.
Specific Aim 1: Test the hypothesis that individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate
dysregulated striatal activity during updating and interference control and that striatal
activity predicts performance deficits.

3.3. Condition Analysis
With regard to our first aim, we first examined whether the striatal activity of patients
displayed different responses to task Condition, updating (Upgreen), interference control
(Upred) and maintenance (Upempty) demands, when compared with controls. For the
independently defined ROIs, we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA at the region level
with condition (3 levels; Upgreen, Upred, and Upempty), diagnosis (2 levels; patients and
controls), and time (5 levels; frames 8-12) as factors, using only the data from correct trials.
Because we were only interested in regions that interacted with at least condition and diagnosis,
we only explored the effects of regions that showed a significant 2-way interaction of condition
by diagnosis, or a significant 3-way interaction of condition by time by diagnosis.
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We then conducted voxel-wise analyses within our a priori anatomical masks. This
analysis involved a repeated measures ANOVA with diagnosis (2 levels), update cue (3 levels),
and time (15 frames) as factors, treating subjects as a random factor. Given that we were
specifically interested in regions that interacted with both diagnosis and condition, regions that
demonstrated either a significant 2-way interaction of diagnosis by condition or a 3-way
interaction of diagnosis by time by condition were used for further analyses. We also examined
effects of condition and diagnosis at the whole brain level to uncover brain regions that
demonstrate interactions of interest that were not within either or ROIs or our anatomical masks.
We set a whole-brain multiple comparison correction of p < 0.05 using a Z > 3 and a cluster
sized of at least 21 contiguous voxels (McAvoy, Ollinger, & Buckner, 2001; Ollinger et al., 2001).
Given that we were primarily interested in effects occurring within our regions of interest we
have chosen to place results from our whole brain analysis in the Supplemental material section.
Of note, we recognize that should we find results in regions in our a priori mask and not regions
outside the mask, we cannot claim specificity to regions inside the mask given the differential
levels of significance required. However, we felt that this was the best balance between
providing sufficient power to test a priori hypotheses and being open to unpredicted effects.
We included all 15 frames in the analyses in the previous step to capture regions that
show effects of interest, but at any time during the course of the trial. Once these regions were
identified, we then tested whether condition effects in these regions occurred in response to the
update events, using a repeated measures ANOVA with diagnosis (2 levels), update cue (3
levels), and time (5 levels; frames 8-12) as factors, treating subjects as a random factor. Only
correct trials were used for this analysis. For regions demonstrating significant interactions of
interest, we explored the interaction in the manner described above examining Upgreen versus
Upempty and Upred versus Upempty for both diagnostic groups separately.
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3.4. Trial type Accuracy Analysis
The second part of Aim 1 involved examining the relationship between brain activity and
behavioral performance. We predicted that patients with schizophrenia would demonstrate
dysregulated striatal activity when compared to controls, and this dysregulation would result in
decreased activity during incorrect trials relative to correct trials when patients are tasked with
making an information update. In addition, given our predicted relationship between interference
control, striatal activity, and aberrant salience, we predicted with when patients are tasked with
ignoring distractors they would demonstrate increased activity during incorrect trials relative to
correct trials. To test these predictions, we examined activity during the update cue phase for
specific probe types used in the task (i.e. Update and Resist Distracter Lure) as a function of
trial accuracy, as opposed to examining the broad update cue conditions (i.e. Upgreen, Upred,
and Upempty) as a function of accuracy.
The benefit of examining individual trial types is that we can test predictions about
specific types of errors. For the Update trial type, an error indicates that the participant rejected
an item that was presented during a green update cue, suggested that this item was not
appropriately incorporated into the participant’s active memory set. Looking at this specific type
of error is more informative than looking at any type of error a participant could make during the
Upgreen condition, as these could involve failing to identify an item that should have been
updated, or incorrectly identifying the to-be-replaced item or incorrectly identifying the novel
probe as correct. In the case of Resist Distracter Lure trials, a correct response indicates that
participants correctly rejected a response probe that was previously presented as a distracter. If
a participant makes an error on this trial type, it indicates that the participant incorrectly
accepted the response probe that was previously presented as a distracter, suggesting that they
made an inappropriate update. Errors made for the Upred condition, on the other hand, could be
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the result of an incorrect acceptance of a distracter, but it could also result from participants
forgetting the original memory set item, or incorrectly identifying a novel probe as correct.
To test these hypotheses, we conducted two repeated measures ANOVA (one
examining Resist Distracter Lure performance and one examining Update performance), with
accuracy diagnosis as the between subject factor (2 levels, patients and controls) and both
accuracy (2 levels, correct and incorrect) and timepoint (15 frames) as within subject factors.
For any significant regions, we conducted a second repeated measures ANOVA for each trial
type of interest with diagnosis (2 levels), accuracy (2 levels), and time (5 levels; frames 8-12) as
factors, to determine whether the effects reflected group differences during the update
component of the trial. We focused our analyses on regions that demonstrated either an
interaction of diagnosis by accuracy, or the 3-way interaction of diagnosis by time by accuracy.
Specific Aim 2: Test the hypothesis that in individuals with schizophrenia,
increased striatal activity during distracter presentation will be positively associated with
aberrant salience symptoms, delusions, and hallucinations of patients with
schizophrenia.

3.5. Relationship between Symptoms and Brain Activity Analysis
The symptom analysis focused on Magical Ideation, Perceptional Aberration, Social
Anhedonia, and Physical Anhedonia from the Chapman scales, as well as the total score from
the ASI. We first sought to replicate the relationships between ASI and other measures of
psychosis proneness and anhedonia observed previously (Cicero et al., 2010), where strong
positive correlations between ASI scores, Magical Ideation, and perceptual aberration were
found. We included measures of anhedonia (Social and Physical) with the expectation that there
would be little or no correlation between measures of anhedonia and measures of psychosis
proneness. By including measures of anhedonia we could assess whether the relationships
between cognition, brain functioning, and symptoms were specific to individual symptom domain
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(e.g. psychosis proneness) or if they generalized to multiple symptom domains (e.g. psychosis
proneness and anhedonia).
To examine the relationship between brain activity and symptom expression we first
restricted our analysis to regions from the Trial Type Accuracy Analysis that demonstrated
sensitivity to differences in accuracy during Resist Distracter Lure and Update trials during the
time period following the presentation of the update cue (frames 8-12). We then extracted the
average magnitude of activity from the 5 time points of interest for these regions and ran
Pearson’s correlation analyses between the average of these time points and symptom scores.
We predicted that patients would display a significant positive correlation between brain activity,
specifically dorsal striatal activity, associated with the update cue during Distracter Resistance
Lure trials and ASI, but only when incorrect responses were made to the probe. We did not
predict a correlation between brain activity associated with Distracter Resistance Lure trials and
ASI when patients made correct responses to the probe, given that ASI and interference control
errors are proposed to result from striatal dysregulation and correct trials are not thought to
result from such dysregulation. That is, striatal activity during incorrect Distracter Lure trials may
represent instances where dysregulation was sufficient enough to produce false alarms,
whereas activity during correct trials was not have sufficient to produce false alarms. Further, as
noted above, we did predict to find significant correlations between ASI and psychosis
proneness scales (i.e. Magical Ideation and Perceptual Aberration). Thus, if dorsal striatal
activity is positively associated with aberrant salience, we would also expect to see a positive
correlation between striatal activity and psychosis proneness scales for patients, but not a
strong correlation between striatal activity and measures of anhedonia.
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4. Results
4.1. Demographics
Demographic data for each group is shown in Table 4.1. We did not observe differences
in gender between groups (χ2 (1) = 1.43, p = 0.23). We conducted T-tests examining differences
of age, subject education, parental education, and measures of IQ between diagnostic groups.
We did not find group differences in parental education (t(36) = -1.19, p = 0.34) or subject
education (t(35) = -0.99, p = 0.9). However, we did find a significant difference of age (t(40) =
2.49, p = 0.02) between groups, such that the patient group was slightly older than the control
group (see Table 4.1). We also found a marginal difference in ethnic composition of our groups
(χ2 (3) = 8.1, p = 0.057, φ = 0.42). Given these differences in age and ethnicity we used these
variables as covariates during all planned follow up analyses that explored effects that
interacted with diagnosis from the voxel-wise analyses.

4.2. Clinical and Cognitive Measures
While controls had numerically higher scores on measures of verbal and non-verbal IQ,
these differences were not statistically significant (verbal IQ trended towards significance (t(40)
= -1.85, p = 0.07)). We observed significant differences between the groups on most symptom
measures, including all Chapman scales (Magical Ideation, Perceptual Aberration, Social
Anhedonia, and Physical Anhedonia; Table 4.1).1 Interestingly, patients and control scores on

4.3. Task Performance

1

Nonparametric tests were used to compare Perceptual Aberration, Physical Anhedonia, and
Magical Ideation between groups as these variables failed to demonstrate variance
homogeneity.
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Table 4. 1 Demographics, Task Data, and Symptom Scores for Patients and Controls
SCZ (N=22)

Controls (N=20)

Sig.

ES (d)

40.41 (8.4)

33.65 (9.19)

0.02

0.77
0.42

Demographics
Age
Gender

75% Male

55% Male

11 AA, 10 Cau

14 AA, 2 Asian, 2 Cau, 1 Other

0.23
0.06

Subject Education (Years)

15.0 (3.51)

15.1 (2.59)

0.9

Parental Education (Years)

13.54 (4.74)

14.7 (3.1)

0.34

IQ (WAIS III - Vocab)

91.36 (17.33)

100.5 (14.32)

0.07

IQ (WAIS III - Matrix)

103.86 (14.55)

105.5 (12.24)

0.7

13.59 (8.29)

9.05 (6.88)

0.79

Race

Neuropsychological Testing/Questionnaires

Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI)
Chapman - Perceptual Aberration*

7.59 (9.23)

2.25 (2.48)

0.06
0.03

0.6

Chapman - Magical Ideation*

11.18 (7.27)

5.10 (4.41)

0.001

1.01

Chapman - Social Anhedonia

19.64 (9.04)

9.35 (6.02)

0.001

1.34

Chapman - Physical Anhedonia*

24.41 (12.68)

10.7 (6.37)

0.001

1.37

Resist Distracter

0.63 (0.23)

0.69 (0.19)

Resist Distracter Lure*

0.52 (0.26)

0.74 (0.19)

0.34
0.006

0.97

Maintenance*

0.67 (0.22)

0.7 (0.16)

0.66

Experimental Task

Update

0.72 (0.17)

0.82 (0.13)

0.46
0.03

Resist Maintenance*

0.49 (0.29)

0.69 (0.16)

0.02

0.85

Resist Distracter Novel Probe

0.60 (0.30)

0.81 (0.25)

0.02

0.76

Maintenance Novel Probe*

0.64 (0.31)

0.81 (0.21)

0.04

0.64

Update Novel Probe*

0.61 (0.32)

0.84 (0.18)

0.02

0.88

Demographics, cognitive scores, symptom scores, and task data for both patients and controls. P-values of differences between
groups are listed under the heading “Sig.” Significant p-values are printed in red text. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for significant between
group differences are listed under the heading “ES (d)”. Variables with an asterisk failed tests of equal variances between groups.
The p-values for these variables were generated using nonparametric tests.
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our measure of aberrant salience (ASI) did not significantly differ from one another, although the
difference between groups trended towards significance (t(40) = 1.92, p = 0.06, d = 0.6). Task
performance for the two diagnostic groups can be seen in Figure 4.1. We also examined our
behavioral data using d’ (the results can be found in Appendix E). Overall, controls performed
better than patients during the task. Our repeated measures ANOVA of trial type (2 levels,
Update and Resist Distracter Lure) and diagnosis (2 levels, patients and controls) revealed a
main effect of diagnosis (F(1,38) = 20.23, p < 0.001), but no main effect of trial type (F(1,38) =
1.76, p = 0.19), and no interaction of trial type and diagnosis (F(1,38) = 2.7, p = 0.11) when
using the sphericity correction. Follow up t-tests revealed that performance for both the Update
trial type (t(38) = -2.47, p = 0.02) and the Resist Distracter Lure trial type (t(38) = -3.35, p =
0.002) differed between patients and controls, such that patients performed significantly worse
on both trial types. Given that we found significant differences of novel probe performance
between diagnostic groups (suggesting a global cognitive deficit rather than one specific to
distracter resistance, for example) we conducted separate multiple regression analyses to test
whether diagnostic group could significantly predict Resist Distracter Lure and Update
performance. We found that diagnostic group trended towards significantly predicting Resist
Distracter Lure performance when controlling for novel probe performance (B = 0.1, t(41) = 1.88,
p = 0.07). We did not find that diagnostic group predicted Update accuracy when controlling for
Update Novel Probe performance, trend or otherwise (B = 0.08, t(41) = 1.33, p = 0.19). A
repeated measures ANOVA on the remaining trial types revealed a significant main effect of
diagnosis (F(1,38) = 14, p = 0.001), a trend towards a main effect of trial type (F(2.5,38) = 2.25,
p = 0.1), and a significant interaction of diagnosis by trial type (F(2.5,38) = 3.11, p = 0.04) when
using the sphericity correction. Follow up t-tests revealed significant differences between
diagnostic groups for all trial types, with the exception of Resist Distracter and Maintenance trial
types (see Table 4.1). For all trial types that demonstrated significant differences between
diagnostic groups, patients performed worse that controls.
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4.4. Replication of Prior fMRI Results in Healthy Individuals
4.4.1. Independently Defined ROI Results
Examination of brain activity in healthy controls within the independently defined ROIs
demonstrated either an effect of condition or an interaction of condition by time (Table 4.2) in all
seven regions. This included bilateral middle frontal gyrus (MFG), left lateral inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG), right lateral precentral gyrus, left lateral putamen, and right lateral caudate body
(Table 4.2). Previously we found that these regions demonstrated either effects of condition or
interactions of condition and time, suggesting these regions were sensitive to task condition. In
the prior study when examining the pattern of activity in these regions in response to the
presentation of the update cue, we found that all regions demonstrated significant differences
between Upgreen and Upempty conditions, suggesting that activity in both cortical and
subcortical regions demonstrated robust activity to updating demands when compared with
activity during simple maintenance. Only cortical regions, however, demonstrated either
significant or trend level differences between Upred and Upempty, suggesting striatal activity
selectively activated to updating demands when compared with distracter presentation and
simple maintenance. In the current study, as predicted, Upgreen activity for all cortical regions
was significantly greater than Upempty activity (with the exception of one region in the
precentral gyrus, although it trended towards significance). Only one cortical region
demonstrated a predicted significant difference between Upred and Upempty (IFG, -39, 4, 30;
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2A), such that Upred activity was greater than Upempty activity. This
finding is a replication of our previous study, suggesting that activity in the IFG is sensitive to
both updating and distracter presentation task demands. Other regions, previously found to
sensitive to both task demands (i.e. right lateral precentral gyrus and left lateral MFG) did not
demonstrate the same condition sensitivity in the current sample, suggesting that condition
sensitivity may be localized to the IFG. Of the striatal regions, the region in the left putamen
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Figure 4. 1 Task Accuracy for Diagnostic Groups
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Table 4. 2 Regions from the Previous Data Set and Their Condition Effect in Healthy Controls from the Current Data Set
X

Y

Z

Size

Hemisphere

Region

BA

Effect at frames 8-12
Analysis of
Current
Study

F

Direction
p

Upgreen vs.
Upempty

Upred vs.
Upempty

Controls, Independently Defined Regions
Condition Effect in Previous Study
-43
22
30
27
Left
MFG
9
Cond
6.83
0.003
G > E**
no diff
-39
4
30
25
Left
IFG
9
Cond
12.89 <0.0001
G > E**
R > E*
41
5
33
20
Right
Precentral Gyrus
9
Cond X Time
3.42
0.03
no diff
no diff
Condition X Time in Previous Study
-18
-3
13
155
Left
Putamen
Cond
4.72
0.02
G > E*
no diff
13
-10
19
46
Right
Caudate Body
Cond X Time
4.37
0.01
no diff
no diff
-42
17
29
211
Left
MFG
9
Cond
8.84
0.001
G > E**
no diff
42
13
32
79
Right
MFG
9
Cond X Time
3.54
0.02
G > E**
no diff
Independently defined ROIs are listed in the table under the heading “Controls, Independently Defined Regions” and are organized
based on whether they demonstrated an effect of condition or interaction of condition and time in the previous study. Statistics from
the update cue response analysis can be found under the heading “Effect at frames 8-12”. Listed under this heading is what analysis
the independently defined ROIs demonstrated the effect as well as the corresponding F and p values of that effect. In the table,
under the heading Direction, the pattern and significance of that effect is listed. MFG = Middle Frontal Gyrus and IFG=Inferior Frontal
Gyrus. G = Upgreen trials, E = Upempty trials, and R = Upred trials. *p<0.05 and **p<0.01. “no diff” signifies no statistically significant
difference.
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demonstrated significantly greater Upgreen versus Upempty activity, but there was no
difference between Upred and Upempty (-18, -3, 13; Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2C). Thus, we
again found that regions within the caudate and putamen demonstrated condition sensitivity to
Upgreen relative to Upempty and not Upred relative to Upempty. This is consistent with
theproposed role of the striatum as an information gate, striatal activity activates when the gate
is open but not when distracters a presented. Further, while a region in the right lateral caudate
demonstrated a significant interaction of condition and time, neither Upgreen nor Upred activity
significantly differed from Upempty activity. When examining the time course of this region
Upempty activity was, unexpectedly, intermediate to that of Upgreen and Upred, which may
explain why neither condition differed from Upempty. When we examined whether Upred and
Upgreen significantly differed within this caudate region we found that they did such that
Upgreen was significantly greater than Upred (F(1,19) = 4.85, p = 0.02).

4.4.2. Anatomical Mask of Basal Ganglia and Prefrontal Cortex
We next conducted voxel-wise analyses in our anatomical a priori regions of interest
using only the data from the healthy controls. Regions demonstrating an effect of condition or an
interaction of condition by time from healthy control subjects can be found in Table 4.3. One
region demonstrated a main effect of condition (left MFG, -43, 29, 27), with follow-up analysis
indicating a highly significant effect of condition during frames 8-12 (F(2,19) = 18.92, p < 0.001;
Figure 4.3A), such that Upgreen was significantly greater than Upempty but there was no
difference between Upred and Upempty. There were 5 regions that demonstrated significant
interactions of condition and time when examining all 15 timepoints, including 3 regions in the
MFG, bilaterally. Only 2 of them (-42, 24, 23 and 42, 21, 29) demonstrated significant effects of
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Figure 4. 2 Brain Activity of Healthy Controls and Patients Within Regions Defined in a Previous Data Set
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Table 4. 3 Regions from the Current Data Set of Healthy Controls that Demonstrated Effects of Condition
X

Y

Z

Size

Hemisphere

Region

BA

Effect at frames 8-12
Analysis

F

Direction
p

Upgreen vs.
Upempty

Upred vs.
Upempty

Regions Identified in Current Data Set in Healthy Controls
Condition
-43
29
27
32
Left
MFG
9
Cond
18.92 <0.0001
G > E**
no diff
Condition X Time
-12
7
9
36
Left
Caudate Body
Cond X Time
2.99
0.004
G > E**
E > R*
20
-1
9
21
Right
Putamen
Cond X Time
0.56
0.81
37
51
3
47
Right
MFG
10 Cond X Time
1.11
0.41
-42
24
24
285
Left
MFG
46 Cond X Time
3.02
0.04
G > E*
no diff
42
21
29
262
Right
MFG
9
Cond
8.4
0.001
G > E**
no diff
Regions within our anatomical masks from healthy control in the current data set that demonstrated Condition effects are listed in the
table under the heading “Regions Identified in the Current Data Set in Healthy Controls”, and are organized on the left side under
headings like “Diagnosis” or “Condition X Time” based on whether they demonstrated these effects when examining all 15 time
frames of the trial. Listed under the heading “Effect at frames 8-12” is in what analysis the independently defined ROIs demonstrated
an effect as well as the corresponding F and p values of that effect. In the table, under the heading Direction, the pattern and
significance of that effect is listed. MFG = Middle Frontal Gyrus. G = Upgreen trials, E = Upempty trials, and R = Upred trials. *p<0.05
and **p<0.01. “no diff” signifies no statistically significant difference.
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Figure 4. 3 Regions of Healthy Controls from the Current Data Set that Demonstrated
Effects of Condition
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condition or condition by time in response to the update cue (Table 4.3). For both of these
regions, Upgreen activity was significantly greater than Upempty, but neither showed
differences between Upred and Upempty activity. While there were two regions in the dorsal
striatum that demonstrated interactions of condition and time when examining all 15 frames of
the trial, only a region in the caudate (-12, 7, 9) continued to demonstrated a significant
interaction of condition and time in analyses restricted to the time periods associated with the
update cue (F(2,19) = 2.99, p = 0.004; Table 4.3). For this region Upgreen activity was
significantly greater than Upempty activity, and there was a significant difference between
Upred and Upempty, such that, unexpectedly, Upempty activity was significantly greater than
Upred activity (Figure 4.3B). Thus, a number of the regions identified in a previous study
demonstrated predicted differences between Upgreen and the comparison condition, Upempty,
such that Upgreen activity was greater than Upempty. Only one region in the IFG demonstrated
a predicted difference between Upred and Upempty.
Specific Aim 1: Test the hypothesis that individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate
dysregulated striatal activity during updating and interference control and that striatal
activity predicts performance deficits.

4.5. Condition Results
4.5.1. Independently Defined ROIs
We started by examining whether activity in the independently defined ROIs differed as
a function of diagnostic group. Results from this analysis can be found in Table 4.4. We found
that activity within 2 regions demonstrated a significant interaction of diagnosis and condition,
including a region in the left IFG (-39, 4, 30) and a region in the left MFG (-42, 17, 29). For the
IFG, activity during the Upgreen condition was significantly greater than activity during Upempty
for both patients and controls (Figure 4.2A and 4.2B). Controls demonstrated significantly
greater Upred than Upempty activity (there was a trend towards greater Upred versus Upempty
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Table 4. 4 Regions from a Previous Data Set and Their Diagnosis by Condition Effects for Patients and Controls from the
Current Data Set
X

Y

Z

Size

Hemi

Region

BA

Diagnosis Interaction
Analysis

F

p

Direction (Patients)
Upgreen vs.
Upempty

Upred vs.
Upempty

Direction (Controls)
Upgreen vs.
Upempty

Upred vs.
Upempty

Condition
-43
22 30
27
Left MFG
9
Dx X Cond 2.55 0.09
-39
4
30
25
Left IFG
9
Dx X Cond 3.76 0.03
G > E**
no diff
G > E**
R > E*
41
5
33
20
Right Precentral Gyrus
9
Dx X Cond 0.56 0.57
Condition X Time
-18
-3
13 155
Left Putamen
Dx X Cond 1.51 0.28
13
-10 19
46
Right Caudate Body
3-way
2.08 0.03
no diff
no diff
no diff
no diff
-42
17 29 211
Left MFG
9
Dx X Cond 3.54 0.02
no diff
R > E*
G > E**
no diff
42
13 32
79
Right MFG
9
Dx X Cond 2.54 0.09
Statistics for independently defined regions that demonstrated diagnosis by Condition effects. We only conducted follow up analyses
for the update cue period on regions that demonstrated a significant effect of condition or a significant interaction of condition and
time. Statistics from the update cue response analysis can be found under the heading “Effect at frames 8-12”. The direction of
Upgreen and Upred versus Upempty effects for controls found in the previous analysis (Table 4.2) are listed to the right of the
direction of effects for patients to ease comparison between the two groups within this table. G = Upgreen trials, E = Upempty trials,
and R = Upred trials. *p<0.05 and **p<0.01. “no diff” signifies no statistically significant difference.
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for patients, p = 0.095). When we compared Upgreen activity for the IFG (-39, 4, 30) between
groups we found a trend towards significantly greater for controls than it was for patients
(F(1,41) = 3.13, p = 0.09), but no difference between groups for Upred activity (F(1,41) = 0.18, p
= 0.67).The other region that demonstrated a diagnosis by condition interaction was a region in
the left MFG. In this region controls demonstrated significantly greater Upgreen than Upempty
activity and this difference trended towards significance for patients (p = 0.07). Interestingly,
within this region, patients, but not controls showed greater Upred than Upempty activity. When
we compared Upgreen activity for the MFG (-42, 17, 29) between groups we found that activity
was significantly greater for controls than it was for patients (F(1,41) = 4.52, p = 0.04), but no
difference between groups for Upred activity (F(1,41) = 0.52, p = 0.47).
A region in the right caudate body (13, -10, 19) demonstrated a 3-way interaction of
diagnosis by time by condition (Table 4.4). However, when comparing Upgreen versus Upempty
and Upred versus Upempty during the frames following the update cue, neither diagnostic group
demonstrated a significant difference between conditions. As mentioned above, examining the
time course for this region revealed an unexpected increase of Upempty activity, such that it
activity was intermediate to Upgreen and Upred for controls. This was not also the case for
patients. Generally, putamen activity for patients was numerically lower than controls and did
not appear to respond to trial events (i.e. the memory set and update cue) that way that control
putamen activity did. The elevated Upempty activity and Upgreen activity for controls may
explain why we observed a significant interaction of diagnosis by condition for this region whilst
failing to observe differences between the comparison condition and Upgreen/Upred. However,
when we compared caudate activity between diagnostic groups during Upgreen and Upred
conditions we found that while controls had numerically higher Upgreen and Upred activity,
these differences were not significant (F(1,41) = 2.19, p = 0.15 and F(1,41) = 1.26, p = 0.27,
respectively).
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Table 4. 5 Regions from the Current Data Set that Demonstrated Diagnosis by Condition Effects Within our Anatomical Masks

X

Y

Z

Size

Hemisphere

Region

4
5
5
19
19
7
2
23
30
28

149
126
126
34
34
282
57
33
65
30

Left
Right
Right
Right
Right
Left
Right
Left
Right
Right

-40
8
33
Condition
-42
4
31
Condition X Time
-19
0
8
17
3
10
36
52
5
-41
23
25
42
20
29
-28
34
33
Diagnosis X Time
-24
-4
2
-16
-5
20
15
-6
21
-39
5
31

31

Left

Globus Pallidus
Globus Pallidus
Globus Pallidus
Caudate Body
Caudate Body
IFG
MFG
MFG
IFG
MFG
Precentral
Gyrus

22

Left

IFG

9

243
152
40
390
265
21

Left
Right
Right
Left
Right
Left

Putamen
Putamen
MFG
MFG
MFG
SFG

10
46
9
9

53
24
35
39

Left
Left
Right
Left

Putamen
Caudate Body
Caudate Body
IFG

9

Diagnosis
-23
-10
24
-11
24
-11
16
-1
16
-1
-40
38
29
53
-36
20
40
9
30
30

BA

46
10
9
9
9
9

46

28
-39
-39
46

31
43
34
22

-5
6
25
26

37
190
44
63

Right
Left
Left
Right

35

6

32

22

Right

IFG
MFG
MFG
MFG
Precentral
Gyrus

47
46
46
46
9

Regions within our anatomical masks from the current data set that demonstrated diagnosis by Condition effects within our
anatomical masks. They are organized on the left side under headings like “Diagnosis” or “Condition X Time” based on whether they
demonstrated these effects when examining all 15 time frames of the trial. We only conducted follow up analyses for the update cue
period on regions that demonstrated a significant interaction of condition and diagnosis. Statistics from the update cue response
analysis can be found under the heading “Effect at frames 8-12”. G = Upgreen trials, E = Upempty trials, and R = Upred trials.
*p<0.05 and **p<0.01. “no diff” signifies no statistically significant difference.
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4.5.2. Anatomical Mask of Basal Ganglia and Prefrontal Cortex
Regions from our a priori anatomical mask analysis that demonstrated either a main
effects of task condition, time, and diagnosis, or interactions are listed in Table 4.5. We focused
our analysis on regions that demonstrated either an interaction of diagnosis by condition or
Diagnosis by time by condition. Results from the whole brain analysis can be found in Appendix
B. Only one region demonstrated a condition X diagnosis interaction: left lateral MFG (-41, 30,
26; not in Table 4.5), an interaction that held when examining only the 5 frames following the
update cue (F(2,41) = 6.4, p = 0.004). The pattern of activity within this region was that only
controls demonstrated significant greater activity during Upgreen versus Upempty (Table 4.5,
Figure 4.4), with no significant difference between Upred and Upempty. When we compared
differences of Upgreen and Upred activity within this region between groups we found that
controls has significantly greater activity during Upgreen relative to patients (F(1,41) = 4.53, p =
0.04) but there was no difference between Upred activity (F(1,41) = 0.7, p = 0.41).

4.6. Trial type Accuracy Results
4.6.1. Anatomical Mask of Basal Ganglia and Prefrontal Cortex
We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA for each trial type with accuracy (correct and
incorrect trials) and time (all 15 time points of the trial) as a within subjects factors, and
diagnostic group (patients and controls) as the between subjects factor, separately for Update
and Resist Distractor Lures. We did not examine trial type effects within the independently
defined regions because those regions were defined by examining Condition effects (e.g.
Upgreen). We could not examine the effect of trial type accuracy in the previous sample due to
lack of behavioral variability (many participants from the previous study made few errors, if any).
Further, these independently defined regions were identified examining differences between
conditions during only correct trials. Thus, it was unclear whether they would demonstrate
effects of accuracy. Given that we were primarily interested in regions that interacted with
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Figure 4. 4 Frontal Region from the Current Data Set that Demonstrated a Diagnosis by Condition Interaction
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diagnosis we focused our analyses on regions that demonstrated either an interaction of
diagnosis by accuracy or diagnosis by time by accuracy. Regions that demonstrated relevant
effects from our whole brain analysis can be seen in the Appendix C and D.
We first focused on the Resist Distracter Lure trial type (Table 4.6). During this trial type
participants are presented with a distracter during the update cue, which they are instructed to
ignore. During the probe, however, they are presented with the item they were instructed to
ignore. Correct trials indicate a correct rejection of the probe and incorrect trials suggest they
inappropriately encoded the distracter. Two regions demonstrated and interaction of accuracy
and diagnosis, including the right lateral putamen (23, 0, 4) and right lateral MFG (40, 13, 30)
when examining all 15 frames of the trial. When examining whether these regions demonstrated
this effect following the presentation of the update cue (in this case, the presentation of a
distracter) we found that both regions still demonstrated a significant interaction of diagnosis
and accuracy (Table 4.6). For patients, activity during incorrect trials (where, at the probe, the
identified the distracter presented during the update cue as a correct response) was significantly
greater than trials when they correctly rejected the distracter at the probe. This was true for both
the putamen (Figure 4.5A) and the MFG (Figure 4.5C). Controls, however, did not show this
pattern. If anything, for controls correct trial activity within a region in the putamen trended
towards being significantly greater than incorrect trial activity following the update cue (Figure
4.5B), which is the opposite of the pattern observed for patients in this region. The same was
true of controls for activity in the MFG, where correct trial activity was numerically greater than
incorrect trial activity (Figure 4.5D).
Next we examined the Update trial type. Here participants are presented with a new
shape during the update cue and are signaled to remember the new shape in place of one of
the original items in the memory set. At the probe they are presented with one of the update
items presented at the update cue, to which they would respond “yes”. Correct responses
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Table 4. 6 Regions Demonstrating an Effect of Diagnosis by Resist Distracter Lure Trial Type Accuracy within our
Anatomical Masks
X

Y

Z

Size

Hemi

Region

BA

Effect at frames 8-12
Analysis

F

p

Correct vs. Incorrect
Patients

Controls

Diagnosis
-25
-18
-1
44
Left
Putamen
-39
35
2
45
Left
IFG
46
23
51
6
21
Right
SFG
10
-33
48
13
22
Left
MFG
10
-33
7
33
25
Left
Precentral Gyrus
9
Accuracy
25
55
3
21
Right
SFG
10
Accuracy X Time
23
-14
7
35
Right
Putamen
Diagnosis X Accuracy
23
0
4
44
Right
Putamen
Dx X Acc
10.41
0.003
cor < incor**
cor > incor**
40
13
30
70
Right
MFG
9
Dx X Acc
14.7 <0.0001 cor < incor**
no diff
Regions from the current data set that demonstrated diagnosis by Resist Update Lure accuracy. They are organized on the left side
under headings like “Diagnosis” or “Accuracy” based on whether they demonstrated these effects when examining all 15 time frames
of the trial. We only conducted follow up analyses for the update cue period on regions that demonstrated a significant interaction of
accuracy and diagnosis. Statistics from the update cue response analysis can be found under the heading “Effect at frames 8-12”.
“cor” = correct trials and “incor” = incorrect trials. *p<0.05 and **p<0.01. “no diff” signifies no statistically significant difference.
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Figure 4. 5 Regions Demonstrating a Diagnosis by Resist Distracter Lure Trial Type Accuracy Interaction
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suggest that information was appropriately remembered, and incorrect responses suggest that
participants did not update the item as instructed. We again focused our analyses on regions
that interacted with at least both diagnosis and accuracy.
When examining all 15 time frames there were 2 regions that demonstrated an
interaction of diagnosis and accuracy (bilateral globus pallidus, -21, -7, 0 and 25, -17, 0) and 2
regions that demonstrated a 3-way interaction of diagnosis by time by accuracy (bilateral IFG,
including 40, 43, 1 and -42, 8, 31). When examining whether these regions continued to interact
with diagnosis and accuracy in analyses restricted to the frames following the presentation of
the update cue (frames 8-12) we found that two regions from bilateral globus pallidus and one
region in the IFG demonstrated significant interactions of diagnosis by accuracy (Table 4.7). For
patients, activity in both regions of the globus pallidus significantly differed when comparing
correct and incorrect Update activity following the presentation of the update cue, such that
correct activity was greater than incorrect activity (Figure 4.6A and 4.6C). For controls, correct
and incorrect activity in these regions also significantly differed from one another, however
incorrect trial activity in both regions was greater than correct trial activity. The pattern for
controls when comparing correct Update trial activity to incorrect Update trial activity was the
opposite of the pattern of correct versus incorrect Update trial activity for patients (Figure 4.6B
and 4.6D). We did not expect to find that healthy controls demonstrate and opposite pattern of
effects relative to patients when looking at correct and incorrect trial performance. One possible
explanation for this may be related to differences in the proportion of correct and incorrect trials
available for analysis between groups. Controls made significantly fewer errors on both Resist
Distracter Lure and Update trials, which could results in more variable averaged time courses
for incorrect trials. This interpretation makes some sense, particularly when visually inspecting
the time course of putamen activity for controls during incorrect Resist Distract Lure trials
(Figure 4.5 B).
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Another region, right lateral IFG, also demonstrated a significant effect of diagnosis by
accuracy following the presentation of the update cue, but when comparing correct and
incorrect Update trial activity within diagnostic groups neither group demonstrated a difference
(Table 4.7). We examined the time course of activity for this region to determine where the
effect was coming from. While numerically the pattern of activity in this region was the same for
patients and controls as what we observed in the globus pallidus (greater correct than incorrect
trial activity following the presentation of the update cue for patients and the opposite pattern for
controls), the differences did not reach significance. There did appear to be differences earlier
during the trial (around the onset of the memory set) for both patients and controls that may
have driven the initial interaction of diagnosis by time by accuracy when we examined all 15
time frames.
For our first aim we found evidence to suggest that patients with schizophrenia
demonstrated deficits of updating and interference control and that, at least for interference
control, there was a trend to suggest that this deficit of behavioral performance for patients was
not due to a general deficit of distracter resistance. That while both cortical and subcortical
activity for controls generally demonstrated condition sensitivity, for patients condition sensitivity
was reduced, particularly within the striatum. We also found that evidence to support our
hypothesis that dysregulated striatal activity was associated with interference control
performance deficits for patients, given that striatal activity during incorrect trials was greater
than correct trial activity. However, contrary to our predictions, we found that for patients a
region in the cortex also demonstrated greater incorrect relative to correct interference control
trial activity. Further, controls demonstrated the opposite pattern of activity relative to patients
when comparing correct and incorrect trial activity, which was not expected.
Specific Aim 2: Test the hypothesis that in individuals with schizophrenia, increased
striatal activity during distracter presentation will be positively associated with aberrant
salience symptoms, delusions, and hallucinations.
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Table 4. 7 Regions Demonstrating an Effect of Diagnosis by Update Trial Type Accuracy within our Anatomical Masks
X

Y

Z

Size

Hemisphere Region

BA

Effect at frames 8-12
Analysis

Diagnosis
24
-9
14
3
-22
-8
-40
38
30
30
23
52
39
18

4
15
5
7
-5
3
28

222
92
251
211
40
23
133

42
-39
8
34
Accuracy
34
-36
8
29
38
44
8
32
Accuracy X Time
27
11
-1
14
28
35
34
-5
87
37
28
29
64
-44
11
29
Diagnosis X Time
49
44
40
-2
180
-40
44
3
91
42
18
30
Diagnosis X Accuracy
-21
-7
0
34
25
-17
0
34

Right
Right
Left
Left
Right
Right
Right
Left

Putamen
Caudate Body
Globus Pallidus
IFG
IFG
SFG
MFG
Precentral
Gyrus

Left
Right

IFG
MFG

9
9

Right
Right
Right
Left

Caudate Body
MFG
MFG
IFG

47
9
9

Right
Left
Right

Sub-Gyral
IFG
MFG

10
10
9

Left
Right

Globus Pallidus
Globus Pallidus

F

p

Correct vs. Incorrect
Patients

Controls

cor > incor*
cor > incor**

cor < incor**
no diff

46
47
10
9
9

Dx X Acc
Dx X Acc
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9.49 0.004
13.99 0.001

Diagnosis X Time X Accuracy
40
43
1
41
Right
IFG
10 Dx X Acc
4.53 0.04
no diff
no diff
-42
8
31
24
Left
IFG
9
Dx X Acc
0.01 0.92
Regions from the current data set that demonstrated diagnosis by Update accuracy. They are organized on the left side under
headings like “Diagnosis” or “Accuracy” based on whether they demonstrated these effects when examining all 15 time frames of the
trial. We only conducted follow up analyses for the update cue period on regions that demonstrated a significant interaction of
accuracy and diagnosis. Statistics from the update cue response analysis can be found under the heading “Effect at frames 8-12”.
“cor” = correct trials and “incor” = incorrect trials. *p<0.05 and **p<0.01. “no diff” signifies no statistically significant difference.
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Figure 4. 6 Regions Demonstrating a Diagnosis by Update Trial Type Accuracy Interaction
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4.8. Relationship between Symptoms and Brain Activity Results
For our second aim we sought to examine the relationship between brain activity,
specifically striatal activity, and aberrant salience for patients with schizophrenia. We first
assessed the relationship between ASI scores and measures of psychosis proneness and
anhedonia from the chapman scales. For patients (Table 4.8, burgundy text) we found that ASI
scores were, as expected, positively correlated with perceptual aberration magical ideation.
However, contrary to expectation, ASI scores were also positively correlated with measures of
physical anhedonia and social anhedonia. For controls, we found that ASI was only significantly
correlated with magical ideation (Table 4.8, green text). All correlations between ASI and
measures from the Chapman scales were positive for controls.
With regard to the relationship between brain activity of patients during correct and incorrect
Resist Distracter Lure trials, we conducted a correlational analysis examining the relationship
between brain activity of regions demonstrating an effect of accuracy by diagnosis (putamen
and MFG, see above) during Distracter Lure trials and symptom expression scores. Because
we predicted that the susceptibility to distracter presentation would be associated with aberrant
salience, we examined brain activity during both correct and incorrect trials.
For patients (burgundy text), aberrant salience did not significantly correlate with
putamen activity in response to the update cue when patients made correct responses. Correct
trial putamen activity of patients significantly positively correlated with only one other measure of
psychosis proneness – magical ideation. Incorrect trial activity in the putamen of patients
following the presentation of the update cue did positively correlate with aberrant salience
(Table 4.8 and Figure 4.7), and this correlation was significant. Incorrect trial activity in the
putamen of patients also demonstrated a significant positive correlation with magical ideation.
We tested whether the correlation between ASI and putamen activity for correct versus incorrect
trials differed for patients (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992), and we found a trend towards
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Table 4. 8 Correlations Between Correct and Incorrect Resist Distracter Lure Trial Type Brain Activity and Aberrant Salience,
Psychosis Proneness, and Anhedonia Measures

ASI
ASI

PR

PA

SA

MI

Putamen
(correct)

Putamen
(incorrect)

MFG
(correct)

MFG
(incorrect)

0.20

0.11

0.38

0.72**

-0.38

-0.32

0.20

-0.24

0.26

0.67**
0.74**

0.51*
0.09
0.39

-0.34
0.03
-0.22

-0.49*
-0.24
-0.6**

-0.35
-0.43
-0.39

-0.71**
-0.59**
-0.76**

-0.47*

-0.41

0.21

-0.44

0.53*

-0.27

0.25

-0.11

0.6**

PR
PA
SA

0.69**
0.48*
0.54**

0.49*
0.7**

MI

0.73**

0.87** 0.56** 0.77**

0.19

0.40

0.19

0.33

0.45*

0.56**

0.34

0.32

0.23

0.43*

0.33

-0.33

-0.33

-0.38

-0.27

-0.34

0.22

-0.32

0.37

0.26

-0.16

0.11

0.22

0.03

0.22

Putamen
(correct)
Putamen
(incorrect)
MFG
(correct)
MFG
(incorrect)

0.63**

0.44
0.34

Correlations between Resist Distracter Lure, correct and incorrect, trial brain activity and clinical symptom measures. Patient
correlations are printed in burgundy and controls correlations are printed in green. ASI = aberrant salience inventory. PR =
perceptual aberration. PA = physical anhedonia. SA = social anhedonia. MI = magical ideation. *p<0.05 (2-tailed) and **p<0.01 (2tailed).
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significance (z=-1.56, p = 0.06). Correct activity in the MFG negatively correlated with ASI
scores, but this correlation did not reach significance. The direction of the correlation between
correct MFG activity and other measures of psychosis proneness, including perceptual
aberration and magical ideation, was also negative but these correlations also did not reach
significance. We were interested in determining whether the correlation between incorrect trial
activity and ASI differed between he putamen and MFG, and found that the correlations did not
significantly differ (z=0.8, p = 0.21).
For controls (Table 4.8, green text), we found no correlation between ASI scores and
either correct or incorrect activity for the putamen and MFG (Table 4.8). Incorrect Resist
Distracter Lure activity in the putamen was negatively correlated with perceptual aberration and
social anhedonia, but did not significantly correlate with any other measure of psychosis
proneness or anhedonia. We found that, when comparing the correlation between putamen
activity and social anhedonia, correlations for correct trial and incorrect trial activity significantly
differed from one another (z=-1.83, p = 0.03). However, we did not find that the correlation
between correct trial putamen activity and perceptual aberration differed from the correlation
between incorrect trial putamen activity and perceptual aberration (z=-0.72, p = 0.24), nor did
the correlation between correct trial putamen activity and magical ideation differ from the
correlation between incorrect trial putamen activity and magical ideation (z=-0.29, p = 0.39). For
the MFG, while correct activity did not significantly correlate with any measure of psychosis
proneness or anhedonia, incorrect trial activity demonstrated significant negative correlations
with perceptual aberration, physical anhedonia, and social anhedonia. The correlation between
MFG activity and perceptual aberration significantly differed between correct and incorrect trials
(z=-1.8, p = 0.04) as did the correlation between MFG activity and social anhedonia when
comparing correct and incorrect trial activity (z=-1.98, p = 0.02), but correlations between MFG
activity and physical anhedonia did not differ when comparing correct and incorrect trials (z=-

60

0.77, p = 0.2). Incorrect trial activity in the MFG for controls was not significantly correlated with
ASI (Figure 4.7) or magical ideation, although the direction of the correlations for these variables
was also negative. Finally, we examined whether the significant correlation between ASI and
incorrect trial putamen activity significantly differed between patients and controls. We found
that, indeed, it did (z=2.89, p = 0.004).
Next we examined the relationship between aberrant salience and brain activity in
regions from the trial type analysis (see above) that demonstrated a significant interaction of
diagnosis and Update accuracy. We found that two regions, bilateral globus pallidus (Table 4.7),
during the Update trial demonstrated a significant interaction of diagnosis by accuracy in
response to the update cue. For both of these regions patients demonstrated a significant
positive correlation between ASI scores and brain activity, but only during correct trials (Table
4.9 and Figure 4.8). The correlation between ASI and incorrect trial activity significantly differed
from the correlation between ASI and correct trial activity for both left (Z= 2.26, p = 0.01) and
right (Z = 2.84, p = 0.002) lateral globus pallidus. Left lateral globus pallidus activity also
significantly correlated with magical ideation in the same direction, but not with perceptual
aberration or the anhedonia measures. Right lateral globus pallidus activity, however,
demonstrated significant positive correlations with all other measures of psychosis proneness
and anhedonia.
For controls, we observed a significant negative correlation between ASI and right lateral
globus pallidus activity during incorrect Update trials. Activity in this region did not significantly
correlate with other measures of psychosis proneness or anhedonia. When we compared the
correlation between ASI and right lateral globus pallidus activity during incorrect and correct
trials we found that no difference between correlations (z=-1.14, p = 0.13). While correct trial
activity in bilateral globus pallidus did not significantly correlate with ASI, we did observe
significant negative correlations with magical ideation (Table 4.9) bilaterally. Neither correlation
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Figure 4. 7 Scatter Plots Depicting the Relationship Between ASI and Brain Activity During Correct Resist Distracter Lure
Trials
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between left and right globus pallidus correct trial activity and magical ideation significantly
differed from respective incorrect trial correlations between brain activity and magical ideation.
For our second aim we predicted that increased activity during striatal activity during
distracter presentation would be positively associated with positive symptoms expression,
particularly with ASI. We found that while correct trial activity of the putamen or MFG did not
significantly correlate with symptom expression incorrect trial activity did, but only for the
putamen and not the MFG. Further, this was true for patients but not controls. This finding was
consistent with the predicted relationship between interference control deficits for patients,
striatal dysregulation, and symptom expression. We also found that for patients increased
globus pallidus activity during correct Update trials was associated with ASI, which is consistent
with the idea that greater activity in the basal ganglia is associated with aberrant salience. While
we would predict that regions within the globus pallidus demonstrate increased activity other
regions (regions within the external capsule) would not. Given its size, it is difficult to say where
the regions demonstrating effects of interest in our study fall within the globus pallidus.

5. Discussion
This study first sought to test whether individuals with schizophrenia have dysregulated
striatal activity when processing cognitive control demands, whether this dysregulation is
associated with performance deficits, and whether striatal activity is associated with aberrant
salience symptoms. The current study was motivated by previous work that proposed a role for
the dorsal striatum as a mechanism of gating during cognitive control (Hazy et al., 2006; Miller,
2013), the putative dependence of this mechanism on dopamine signaling, and evidence of
dysregulated dopamine signaling in the associative striatum for patients with schizophrenia
(Howes et al., 2012; Kegeles et al., 2010). Thus, we first predicted that the brain activity of
patients, particularly in the dorsal striatum, would differ from controls during updating and
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interference control performance. Using a novel task that separately examined updating,
interference control, and simple maintenance, we found evidence suggesting that both
prefrontal and striatal activity differed between patients and controls during the execution of task
demands. Overall, patients demonstrated a decreased magnitude of prefrontal activity in
response to updating demands when compared with controls, and, unlike controls, patients did
not show differences in activation between updating and interference control relative to simple
maintenance in the striatum. We found some evidence for altered caudate activity during task
processing, though the pattern was not as clear as that for prefrontal cortex. When examining
differences of brain activity between diagnostic groups during correct and incorrect updating and
predicted that dysregulated striatal activity would be associated with aberrant symptom
expression for patients. We found that, indeed, striatal activity was associated with aberrant
salience symptom expression for patients but not controls and the correlation between striatal
activity and aberrant salience significantly differed between diagnostic groups. Interestingly,
although both prefrontal cortical activity and striatal activity of patients with schizophrenia
demonstrated similar patterns of activity in response to cognitive control demands, only striatal
activity was significantly correlated with aberrant salience symptom expression. Each of these
findings will be discussed in more detail below. However, first we will discuss the results of our
replication analyses in just the healthy controls.

5.1. Replication of Prior fMRI Results in Healthy Individuals:
5.1.1. Independently Defined ROI
Previously we found that cortical activity increased during both information updating
events and distracter presentation compared to a basic maintenance condition, but that activity
within the dorsal striatum selectively activated to information updating and not interference
control (Ceaser et al., in prep). Further, we found that during the presentation of the update cue,
only brain activity within an anatomical mask of the basal ganglia, and not the prefrontal or
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Table 4. 9 Correlations Between Correct and Incorrect Update Trial Type Brain Activity and Aberant Salience, Psychosis
Proneness, and Anhedonia Measures

ASI

ASI

PR

PA

SA

MI

L Globus
Pallidus
(correct)

L Globus
Pallidus
(incorrect)

R Globus
Pallidus
(correct)

R Globus
Pallidus
(incorrect)

0.20

0.11

0.38

0.72**

-0.11

-0.24

-0.31

-0.59*

0.26

0.67**

0.51*

-0.05

0.16

-0.31

0.26

0.74**

0.09

0.11

0.32

-0.03

0.30

0.39

0.03

0.22

-0.22

0.21

-0.48*

-0.43

-0.59*

-0.38

0.65**

0.65**

0.17

0.52*

0.42

PR

0.69**

PA

0.48*

0.49*

SA

0.54**

0.7**

0.63**

MI

0.73**

0.87**

0.56**

0.77**

0.58**

0.37

0.37

0.31

0.51*

0.15

0.21

0.24

0.17

0.29

0.58**

0.64**

0.54*

0.52*

0.6**

0.65**

0.86**

0.41

-0.16

0.12

0.21

0.10

-0.06

0.08

0.51*

L Globus
Pallidus
(correct)
L Globus
Pallidus
(incorrect)
R Globus
Pallidus
(correct)
R Globus
Pallidus
(incorrect)

0.27

0.11

Correlations between Update, correct and incorrect, trial brain activity and clinical symptom measures. Patient correlations are
printed in burgundy and controls correlations are printed in green. ASI = aberrant salience inventory. PR = perceptual aberration. PA
= physical anhedonia. SA = social anhedonia. MI = magical ideation. *p<0.05 and **p<0.01.

65

Figure 4. 8 Scatter Plots Depicting the Relationship Between ASI and Brain Activity During Incorrect Update Trials
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parietal cortices, could significantly predicted whether an individual made a correct or incorrect
response at the probe. These results provided some support for the idea that the basal ganglia
may function as a mechanism of information gating during cognitive control, and were
consistent with previous studies examining subcortical contributions to cognitive control. For
example, a lesion study of stroke patients found that lesions of the left lateral putamen and
surrounding white matter resulted in deficits of distracter resistance (Baier et al., 2010),
suggesting that the basal ganglia may play an important role in gating relevant information.
Similarly, McNab et al. (McNab & Klingberg, 2008) found that the globus pallidus demonstrated
selective associations with filtering unnecessary storage activity, suggesting that increases of
globus pallidus activity may serve to filter our distracters from entering working memory storage.
Other studies have shown that the dorsal striatum is involved in selective updating (Murty et al.,
2011; Roth et al., 2006) and working memory manipulation (Lewis, Dove, Robbins, Barker, &
Owen, 2004) when compared with other cognitive control processes. A study of dopamine
depletion in the caudate of marmoset monkeys demonstrated the importance of dopamine when
executing these cognitive processes, as the monkeys demonstrated selective deficits of a
delayed response task but preserved attentional set-shifting (Collins, Wilkinson, Everitt,
Robbins, & Roberts, 2000), although dopamine depletion influencing updating may not be the
only explanation of these results.
Using the regions from our previous study we examined whether healthy controls from
our current data set demonstrated the same pattern of condition effects. We again found that
healthy control participants demonstrated greater prefrontal and striatal activity during updating
than simple maintenance conditions. We also found some evidence that prefrontal activity in
these independently defined regions demonstrated some transient activity to distracter
presentation, consistent with our previous findings, though not all of the prefrontal regions
demonstrated this effect. We did not find a significant response to distracter presentation within
any of the striatal regions. These findings are partially consistent with the findings from our
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previous study, and suggest that while both the cortex and striatum process updating demands,
the striatum may selectively activate and the PFC, particularly the IFG, may demonstrate more
general condition sensitivity. For one of the independently defined striatal regions (right lateral
caudate) we found maintenance activity that was intermediate to interference control and
update activity. This was unexpected, given that participants were not presented with any
shapes during the maintenance condition and maintenance activity that was greater than
interference control activity was not something we found during our previous study. Because we
used maintenance trials as our comparison condition increased activity during this condition
may explain why we did not find differences between maintenance and updating or interference
control. This finding is discussed in more detail below.

5.1.2. Anatomical Mask of Basal Ganglia and Prefrontal Cortex
In this analysis we identified regions that demonstrated condition effects (instead of
examining condition effects only within regions defined in the prior study) and found multiple
regions within the left and right MFG demonstrated condition effects in response to the
presentation of the update cue, as did one region in the left caudate. The pattern for regions
within the MFG was that updating activity was significantly greater than maintenance, with no
difference between interference control and maintenance. While interference control activity in
this region was numerically higher than maintenance activity (Figure 4.3A) following
presentation of the update cue, the fact that we did not find a significant difference between
these conditions is not consistent with our previous work. It may be the case, however, that we
generally lacked the power reliably to detect this subtle difference between the transient cortical
response to distracter presentation and activity during the maintenance condition, even though
our control sample in this data set is larger than the previous data set. That is, we found the
same relative patterns of activity that we did in our previous study but given the difference
between interference control and maintenance activity is small although the difference exists the
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significance of this difference may vary across smaller samples. The region in the caudate also
demonstrated greater updating than maintenance activity, but greater maintenance activity
when compared with interference control activity. One explanation for this increase of activity
during maintenance trails compared to interference trials within the striatum is that it may reflect
a salient cue orientation signal (Redgrave, Gurney, & Reynolds, 2008), as discussed next.
We used maintenance as a comparison condition because, unlike updating and
interference control conditions, no shapes are presented during the update cue period. We
assumed that there should be little to no change in striatal activity during this period given that
striatal neuron projecting to the direct pathway would not activate in the absence of stimulus
presentation and striatal neurons projecting to the indirect pathway are tonically active, and
would not demonstrate a change of activation. After reviewing plots of time courses during the
three different update cue conditions we see that this is not the case, and for many regions
there is in fact mild to moderate increases of brain activity during the update cue period of
maintenance trials. While no shapes were presented during this time empty boxes that are
either red or green in color are presented and this presentation may be sufficient to elicit an
increase of striatal activity, particularly in the caudate given that the boxes are salient and
behaviorally relevant. A study by Zink et al. (2003) examined in humans the possibility that the
striatum may function to process salient events regardless of reward value, rather than coding
rewards and reward-related stimuli. They examined striatal response to nonrewarding salient
stimuli using fMRI while manipulating the behavioral relevance of stimuli by manipulating
salience by manipulating the frequency of distracter occurrence (such that high frequency
resulted in less salience) and the behavioral relevance of the distracter (distracters that required
a response and those that did not). They found that activity in both the nucleus accumbens and
caudate increased in response to high salience nonrewarding stimuli, but activity in the caudate
only did so when the stimuli was behaviorally relevant. Thus, increased caudate activity we
observed during maintenance may reflect the salient, behaviorally relevant, properties of the
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green and red boxes presented during maintenance trials. Further, increased maintenance
activity compared with interference control activity may also reflect the increased salience of
“no-shape” maintenance trials when compared with “ignore-shape” distracter trials, given that
the majority of trials used in the task presented either one or two shapes and thus maintenance
trials were less frequent.
Specific Aim 1: Test the hypothesis that individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate
dysregulated striatal activity during updating and interference control and that striatal
activity predicts performance deficits.

5.2. Condition Discussion
To address our first aim we examined brain activity during updating, distracter
presentation, and simple maintenance in both our independently defined ROIs and in an
anatomical mask of the prefrontal cortex and the striatum. Given that patients with
schizophrenia may have dysregulated striatal activity and that activity in the striatum may be
associated with information gating, we predicted that patients would demonstrated an
attenuated striatal response in response to updating demands and an attenuated response to
task conditions cortically. We first examined diagnostic differences at the condition level to
identify broad difference in responses to updating, distracter presentation, and simple
maintenance in regions that were defined using a previous data set of healthy controls. Three
regions demonstrated significant interactions of condition and diagnosis – two in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and one region in the caudate. Patients demonstrated greater DLPFC
activity for updating compared to maintenance activity and even significantly greater DLPFC
activity during interference control when compared with maintenance. Within the caudate there
were no differences between conditions for patients and a plot of the time course revealed poor
separation between conditions following the update cue. Controls also demonstrated
significantly greater update and interference control DLPFC activity when compared with
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maintenance and no difference between conditions in the caudate, however a plot of the time
course for controls revealed that there was separation between conditions but maintenance
activity in the caudate that was intermediate to update and interference control activity. We did
find that update and interference control activity for controls in the caudate significantly differed
when we compared them directly. When comparing neural response to task demands between
diagnostic groups we found that updating activity within the IFG and MFG for controls was
significantly greater than updating activity within these regions for patients, but that there was no
difference between groups when examining interference control activity within these regions and
no differences between groups when examining caudate activity. So, while updating activity in
the DLPFC for patients was significantly greater than comparison conditions, updating activity
was still significantly lower than for controls. In the anatomical mask analysis, we found only one
region in the MFG (BA 9) that demonstrated an interaction of condition and diagnosis. In this
region, controls demonstrated significantly greater updating activity when compared with
maintenance (an numerically greater interference control activity compared with maintenance),
whereas patients did not demonstrate significant differences between task conditions. When
comparing the neural response to task demands between diagnosis groups we found no
differences, although control activity to updating and interference control was numerically
greater.
These results provide some support for the hypothesis that patients would demonstrate
dysregulated striatal activity during cognitive control demands, as evidenced by poor
discrimination during 3 different task conditions. Interestingly, this was true when examining
correct trials and this lack of discrimination was truer for the striatum than it was for regions
within the DLPFC when examining our independently defined regions (Table 4.4), although
activity for patients in one region of the DLPFC (MFG; -41, 30, 26; Figure 4.4) also
demonstrated poor discrimination between conditions. Importantly, however, we also saw
evidence for altered activity in the DLPFC. Of the DLPFC regions that demonstrated an
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interaction of diagnosis by condition we also observed that the response to updating demands
for patients within a region was numerically lower than controls. It is interesting that the regions
demonstrating tasks effects within our anatomical masks correspond to segments of the
striatum striatal that have anatomical and functional connectivity with the DLPFC. For example,
Draganski et al. (2008) examined cortico-striatal connectivity using probabilistic tractography
and a novel method of creating voxel-based connectivity profiles to represent projections from a
source to multiple target regions, called voxel connectivity profiles, on magnetic resonance
diffusion imaging data of 30 healthy subjects. The aim of the study was to compare basal
ganglia and thalamic connectivity of humans with anatomical patterns demonstrated in
nonhuman primates, and to provide evidence of pathways between spatially segregated regions
of the basal ganglia/thalamus and cortical regions. Amongst other findings, they found that
rostral and caudal regions within the caudate and putamen demonstrated strong connectivity
with the DLPFC and orbital frontal cortex (OFC). These findings were supported by Barnes et al.
(2010), who used a combination of resting state functional connectivity MRI and graph theoretic
analyses to parcellate subcortical structures of individual subjects and found that the locations
of significant cortical-basal ganglia functional connectivity was consistent with connectivity of
basal ganglia segments described above. While there is good evidence for both anatomical and
functional connectivity between segmented cortico-striatal loops, the nature of the relationship
during cognitive control has yet to be fully elucidated. A critical question for future research is to
what degree does altered activity in the striatum and the DLPFC reflect an abnormal functional
loop, and whether some of the variance in DLPFC disruption in schizophrenia might actually
reflect dysregulated striatal function.
One way that cortico-striatal loops may impact cognitive control is through information
gating, which may be accomplished through dense dopaminergic innervation of the striatum that
transiently strengthen inputs to the frontal cortex, and by extending models of disinhibitory
gating from the motor literature. As described in the introduction section, this gating mechanism
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has been described computationally by Frank et al. (2001) and, more recently, by Hazy et al.
(Hazy et al., 2007). In this model, dopamine based reinforcement-learning provides appropriate
learning signals that train direct pathway medium spiny neurons (MSNs) in the dorsal striatum
when to fire, inhibiting the substantia nigra, which then releases the thalamus from tonic
inhibition. Thalamic disinhibition enables, but does not cause, excitation of a segregated corticostriatal loop and thus an information update, the same way that disinhibition via the basal
ganglia sets a pattern of motor readiness in premotor networks rather than generating a
command for muscular contraction (Chevalier & Deniau, 1990). Striatal spiny neurons in the
indirect pathway are in competition with neurons in the direct pathway as they promote greater
inhibition of thalamic neurons. In the prefrontal cortex, robust maintenance occurs through a
combination of recurrent excitatory connectivity and bistability, which is toggled to and from a
maintenance state via input from the basal ganglia. Hazy et al. (2007) also suggests that
actively maintained representations in the prefrontal cortex may demonstrate top-down biasing
of processing in relevant brain areas (e.g. posterior cortex, hippocampus, and basal ganglia),
which may occur only when output-generating laminae within frontal cortical columns reach a
threshold via basal ganglia-thalamic input signals (Hazy et al., 2007). Similarly, others suggests
that dopamine and basal ganglia output may function to stabilize the information gate during
distraction by enhancing task relevant memories in the cortex (Gruber et al., 2006) or that
output from the basal ganglia gradually trains or builds up representations in the prefrontal
cortex, and that without this input cortical representations are not as robust or distinct (Miller,
2013).
Based on the relationship between the prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia described in
the models discussed above, certain predictions could be made about how these regions will
behave during specific task conditions. For example, during information updating one can
expect that MSNs in the direct pathway will activate more strongly than MSNs in the indirect
pathway, resulting in inhibition of the substantia nigra, disinhibition of the thalamus, and
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activation of the prefrontal cortex region within that cortico-striatal loop. During interference
control, however, without appropriate dopaminergic input, MSNs in the indirect pathway will
continue their tonic inhibition of the substantia nigra, which leads to inhibition of the thalamus
and cortical regions within that segregated loop. The prefrontal cortex will activate in response
to a distracter, but without basal ganglia-thalamic input signals this activation will not reach
threshold. Thus, if dopamine signaling in the striatum were disrupted, as is the case with
psychosis, one may expect that striatal output would be affected, perhaps though increased
competition between direct and indirect MSNs resulting in weaker activation in response to
updating demands, and with weaker basal ganglia-thalamic output to the cortex the cortical
threshold would be more difficult to meet. Our finding that within the striatum patients
demonstrated poor discrimination between conditions and appear to have an attenuated cortical
response to updating demands are consistent with these predictions.
The models also imply that increases of brain activity in dorsal striatal and prefrontal regions
should be associated with an update occurring, regardless of whether the update should have
happened, because the “gate” opens anytime information is admitted to working memory stores.
Further, a failure to update should be associated with decreased striatal and prefrontal activity
because the “gate” failed to open. If a participant were to inappropriately update a distracter, for
example, we would expect to see similar patterns of prefrontal and striatal activity that we would
see during an appropriate update. We explored this idea in our analysis of trial type accuracy.

5.3. Trial type Accuracy Discussion
Given differences of behavioral accuracy between diagnostic groups during the Update
and the Resist Distracter Lure trial types we examined whether brain activity during correct and
incorrect trials differed within prefrontal and striatal regions, and across diagnostic groups. The
Resist Distracter Lure trial is interesting because at the response probe participants are
presented with items they should have ignored earlier during update cue. If participants indicate
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that this items is correct it suggests that they inappropriately updated or attended to this item
instead of ignoring it as instructed. This inappropriate update should be reflected in changes of
brain activation during the update cue. Further, this analysis is interesting because it examines
differences of brain activity between correct and incorrect Resist Distracter Lure trials that occur
during time frames associated with the update cue, even though distinguishing feature between
correct and incorrect trials is the response to the probe that occurs later. As predicted we found
increased activity for incorrect trials compared with correct trials within a right DLPFC region
and within the right putamen, but for patients not controls. For controls, activity within the
DLPFC demonstrated no difference between correct and incorrect trials, and greater correct trial
activity than incorrect trial activity within the putamen – the opposite pattern of patients with
schizophrenia. This finding supports the idea that for patients, activity occurring in response to
the update cue, even when instructed to ignore these items, meaningfully contributes to later
behavioral accuracy at the probe. Not only did we find that there were differences in activity for
correct trials and incorrect trials, suggesting that striatal activity was not simply a byproduct of
arousal due to stimulus orientation, but we found greater activity during incorrect trials. This
finding fits the prediction one would make based on the computational models of gating (e.g.
Frank et al., 2001) described above, where increases of striatal and prefrontal activity are
associated with gating information into working memory, and suggests that this processing will
lead to a someone identifying an incorrect item as correctly matching a memory representation.
We also examined whether cortical and subcortical brain activity differed between
diagnostic groups during correct and incorrect Update trials. Correct responses during Update
trials indicate that the participant correctly identified the “to-be-remembered” shape at the probe
and incorrect trials indicate that the participant rejected the shape, suggesting they did not
update or encode new information as instructed. Again, although correct and incorrect trials are
defined by the response made at the probe, we examined activity that was associated with the
presentation of the “to-be-remembered” items. Behaviorally, we found that patients and control
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performance significantly differed for this trial type, although the effect was smaller for the
Update (Cohen’s d = 0.66) versus the Resist Distracter Lure trial type (Cohen’s d = 0.97). With
regard to brain activity, we found that bilateral globus pallidus activity for patients was
significantly greater for correct than incorrect trials.
In Hazy et al. (2007) model described above, the globus pallidus is associated with the
indirect pathway and receives inhibitory input from striatal MSNs. This inhibition activates the
globus pallidus, causing disinhibition of substantia nigra pars reticulata (which is tonically
inhibited by the globus pallidus), and this disinhibition of the substantia nigra competes with
inhibitory input from striatal MSNs associated with the direct pathway. Thus, increases of
activation of the globus pallidus should disinhibit the substantia nigra, making it less likely that
the cortex will be released from thalamic inhibition and less likely that an update will occur. Our
finding of greater activity on correct versus incorrect trials in the globus pallidus in patients is not
consistent with the predictions of the Hazy model, depending on where in particular the regions
of the globus pallidus lie. However, this result might be consistent with the findings of McNab et
al. (2008). They found that increases of globus pallidus activity, which preceded the
presentation of distracters, was associated with increasing working memory storage. They
suggested that the globus pallidus might function as an information filter that increases activity
in response to relevant task information and decreases activity in response to irrelevant
information. In this context it makes some sense that increases of activity within the globus
pallidus are associated with correct trials of information updating as task relevant information is
being filtered in and lower activity is associated with errors, but again we only found this pattern
of effects for patients and not controls. Of the two globus pallidus regions that demonstrated a
significant interaction of diagnosis and accuracy for Update trials, controls only demonstrated a
difference between correct and incorrect trial activity within the left lateral globus pallidus, such
that correct trial activity was significantly less than incorrect trial activity (Figure 4.6B) – the
opposite pattern that patients displayed.
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The findings from our trial type accuracy analyses provide some support our hypotheses
from Aim 1, such that for patients striatal activity distinguished between correct and incorrect
trials suggesting that increases of striatal activity during distracter presentation are associated
with deficits of interference control. However, we did not find that striatal activity selectively
distinguishes between correct and incorrect Resist Distracter Lure trials as a region in the
DLPFC also demonstrated significant differences between correct and incorrect trial activity for
patients. Further, we found evidence that for patients the globus pallidus significantly
distinguished between correct and incorrect Update trial activity for patients, although the
pattern of the effect again differed between diagnostic groups and was, perhaps, not consistent
with the predictions of the Hazy model.
Unfortunately, with our current design it is difficult to disentangle the causal contributions
of prefrontal and striatal regions have on behavioral outcomes, given the relationship between
basal ganglia output and prefrontal function described above. For example, it is possible that
basal ganglia output precedes prefrontal activation and increases of activity represent
information updating whereas prefrontal activity represents storage and maintenance related
activity of the updated item. It is also possible that prefrontal activity during distracter
presentation may occur first and increases of striatal activity result from downstream effects of
cortical activity, perhaps through glutamatergic afferents from the cortex to spiny neurons in the
striatum (Rosell & Giménez-Amaya, 1999). Further, we did not find the same pattern of activity
during correct and incorrect Resist Distracter Lure trials for controls. If this cortico-striatal
mechanism is indeed a mechanism of gating we should expect to see the same pattern of
results regardless of diagnostic status. That is, if controls inappropriately update information it
should be reflected in a neural response of the striatum and the prefrontal cortex. The fact that
we failed to find differences between correct and incorrect trials for controls or the patterns we
did find were the opposite of patients with schizophrenia might suggest that the activity we
observed for patients reflects something might be specific to disease state and not directly
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related gating. However, when examining brain activity in regions that showed interactions of
accuracy and time for the Resist Distracter Lure and Update trials (e.g. right putamen, Table 4.6
and right caudate, MFG and left IFG, Table 4.7) to explore the pattern of brain activity between
groups as a function of accuracy, we found that for a region in the putamen that demonstrated
an accuracy by time interaction both patients and controls demonstrated numerically greater
incorrect Resist Distracter Lure trial activity than correct trial activity. Further, the activity for both
patients and controls in regions that demonstrated an effect of Update accuracy by time did not
appear to differ when comparing correct and incorrect trials to one another. Thus, we found
some evidence that to suggest that patient and control activity during correct and incorrect
Resist Distracter Lure and Update trials is more comparable, but further work is need to
determine if the counterintuitive finding that patients and controls demonstrate opposite patterns
of brain activity during task performance.
It may also be the case that errors made by controls were related to processing deficits
that had little to do with the inappropriate processing of distracters during the update cue, and
were related to other factors that made them error prone (e.g. inattention at the probe). If this
were the case the neural signature that would distinguish correct from incorrect trials may not
have occurred in either prefrontal or striatal regions, and may have occurred at some other point
during the trial than the update cue response period. Another possibility is that we simply lacked
a sufficient number of error trials for controls to detect reliable differences of brain activity
between correct and incorrect trials, given that patients’ behavioral performance was
significantly worse than controls for both Resist Distracter Lure and Update trial types. While it is
difficult to make conclusive statements about the trial type accuracy results from our control
sample, it was clear that patients demonstrated increased susceptibility to distracters, with a
large effect size, and poorer updating behaviorally, and that these performance deficits were
associated with striatal and prefrontal activity during update cue presentation.
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Specific Aim 2: Test the hypothesis that in individuals with schizophrenia, increased
striatal activity during distracter presentation will be positively associated with aberrant
salience symptoms, delusions, and hallucinations of patients with schizophrenia.

5.4. Relationship between Symptoms and Brain Activity Discussion
Our second aim was to identify a relationship between behavioral deficits of cognitive control,
brain activity associated with these deficits, and symptom expression. More specifically, we
predicted that striatal activity of patients would demonstrate a relationship between cognitive
control deficits and aberrant salience symptom expression given the possibility that mechanisms
of cognitive control may also be involved in regulating salience assignment.
The results of our Trial Type Accuracy analysis revealed that, for Resist Distracter Lure trials,
patients demonstrated increased activity both in the striatum and DLPFC when an inappropriate
update may have occurred. We examined whether this activity was associated with aberrant
salience, other measures of psychosis proneness, and anhedonia. We found that only striatal
activity during incorrect trials correlated significantly with aberrant salience, such that individuals
with higher striatal activity during incorrect trials had higher aberrant salience scores. Further,
we found that within the same striatal region, the correlation between aberrant salience and
incorrect trial activity was stronger than the correlation between aberrant salience and incorrect
trial activity, suggesting some specificity, although the effect was only at trend level. When
examining the relationship between striatal activity and other psychosis proneness scores we
found that both correct and incorrect trial activity in the striatum similarly correlated with another
psychosis proneness measure (magical ideation; r = 0.45 and r = 0.43, respectively) and not,
importantly, with measures of anhedonia. We included measures of anhedonia to contrast the
relationship between brain activity and symptoms associated with positive symptoms and
symptoms associated with negative symptoms. We predicted that if brain activity associated
with cognitive control gating should be more strongly associated with positive symptoms than
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negative symptoms given that altered salience assignment is primarily an explanation of
psychotic symptoms associated with schizophrenia as discussed by Kapur (2003). Thus, while
patient striatal activity during Resist Distracter Lure trials was more broadly correlated with
positive symptoms, aberrant salience was selectively associated with errors associated with
deficits of interference control. Within the DLPFC, we found no significant correlation between
any of the symptom measurements for patients and brain activity. For controls, we found no
significant correlation between aberrant salience and brain activity. There was a relationship
between activity in the striatum and DLPFC and positive symptoms and anhedonia in controls,
but in an opposite direction than that found for patients.
Results from the Update trial type analysis for patients revealed somewhat similar
results, such that increases of globus pallidus activity during correct trial only were significantly
correlated with aberrant salience and other measures of psychosis proneness and anhedonia.
So again, we find that for patients greater basal ganglia activity is associated with greater
symptom expression of aberrant salience, but also greater expression of psychosis proneness
and anhedonia, although left lateral globus pallidus was selectively correlated with psychosis
proneness and not anhedonia. For controls, we found negative correlations between correct and
incorrect Update trial globus pallidus activity and aberrant salience, psychosis proneness, and
anhedonia. Again, this was the opposite pattern that we observed for patients.
The reversed direction of correlations between brain activity and symptom scores in
patients versus controls was unexpected, but perhaps not too surprising given patients and
controls demonstrated the opposite pattern of brain activity during correct and incorrect Resist
Distracter Lure and Update trials. However, that explanation does not fully account for why, at
and individual level, symptom expression increases for controls as brain activity decreases. It is
possible that differences in the degree to which patients and controls express symptoms may
have impacted our results. For example, all measures from the Chapman scales demonstrated
significant differences between patients and controls, which may make one wonder if symptom
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expression for controls was at floor levels with little variation across individuals. It is important to
point out that there was only a trend level difference of aberrant salience symptoms between
patients and controls, suggesting variation of symptom expression was somewhat comparable
between patients and controls. One benefit of the ASI is that it was determined to be a valid
measure of aberrant salience for both clinical and nonclinical samples (Cicero et al., 2010).
Thus, ASI symptoms expressed some range across individuals, but do these symptoms
correlate with other measures of psychosis proneness and anhedonia in the way we would
expect them to? We found that within the control sample aberrant salience was highly correlated
with psychosis proneness but not anhedonia, providing evidence of discriminant validity within
our nonclinical sample. So, while symptom expression for controls in this sample is lower than
patients we have some evidence suggesting symptom expression within our control sample
demonstrates some variability and behaves as expected. Even so, the correlations between
brain activity during task performance and aberrant salience for controls were almost uniformly
negative, like they were for other measures of psychosis proneness and anhedonia.
One potential interpretation of these findings is that they perhaps run contrary to the idea
that psychotic experience exists as a part of a continuum (described previously by Linscott &
van Os, 2010), or that psychotic experiences and odd thinking exist to a lesser degree in
nonclinical sample and are produced by some of the same mechanisms that produce these
symptoms in clinical samples. For example, we found that psychotic symptoms that presumably
have the same underlying mechanism correlated differently with striatal activity between
patients and controls. Others that have examined the relationship between brain activity and
psychosis proneness of healthy individuals, to detect regions associated with psychotic
symptom expression within nonclinical samples, have found mixed results. For example,
Ettinger et al. (2013) examined psychosis proneness and neural activation during a procedural
learning task, thought to be sensitive to sensitive to dopamine fluctuation, and found positive
correlations between psychosis proneness and, amongst other regions, the caudate, putamen,

81

and frontal regions. However, these findings were not consistent with previous work of theirs
examining the relationship between psychosis proneness and fronto-striatal-thalamic brain
activity during involuntary or voluntary inhibition (from Ettinger et al., 2013), where they found
negative relationships between brain activity and psychosis proneness. They suggest that this
may be explained by differential influences of dopamine on tasks involving inhibition and tasks
involving procedural learning. Further, Corlett et al. (2012) examined the relationship between
brain activity during prediction error and psychosis proneness for a sample of healthy volunteers
and found negative correlations between symptom expression and brain activity in the dorsal
striatum and DLPFC, however they do not interpret the direction of this finding. Further work is
needed to clarify some of the causal neural mechanisms of psychotic symptom expression
within nonclinical samples and the degree to which similar relationships are found in clinical and
non-clinical samples
Regarding the relationship between aberrant salience and brain activity for individuals
with schizophrenia, our findings of a relationship between aberrant salience and dorsal striatal
activity are somewhat distinct from previous studies. For example, Roiser et al. (2009)
examined whether patients with schizophrenia demonstrated deficits of motivational incentive
salience, or learning stimulus-reinforcement associations where neutral stimuli acquire
relevance through primary reinforcement and subsequently influence behavior. They used a
novel task, the Salience Attribution Task (Schmidt & Roiser, 2009), that required participants to
make speeded responses to earn money in the presence of conditioned stimuli, and found that
while some patients demonstrated adaptive motivational salience acquisition patients with
greater delusional symptoms demonstrated aberrant salience acquisition. However, they found
that aberrant salience was correlated only with negative symptoms. Using the same task they
examined the neural basis of adaptive motivational salience acquisition in healthy controls and
found that higher cue relevance was associated with increased activity within the ventral
tegmental area and its dopaminergic projections, including the thalamus, ventral striatum, and
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prefrontal cortex – regions previously implicated in motivational salience – and positive
correlations between brain activity and adaptive reward learning (Roiser, Stephan, Ouden,
Friston, & Joyce, 2010). This same group examined whether patients at high-risk for developing
psychosis demonstrated aberrant incentive salience as well as altered dopamine synthesis
capacity and brain activity relative to controls during salience acquisition. While they found no
group differences between aberrant reward prediction and no difference between dopamine
synthesis capacity, they did find aberrant salience acquisition behaviorally for the high-risk
group that differed relative to controls and a positive correlation between ventral striatal
responses and inappropriate salience assignment (Roiser, Howes, Chaddock, Joyce, &
McGuire, 2013).
Taken together, these findings provide some evidence demonstrating that aberrant
incentive salience is associated with psychosis and psychosis risk, and that as expected
salience acquisition is associated with brain regions previously identified to be associated with
this type of learning, including the ventral striatum. However, they acknowledge the conundrum
that despite the relationship between the ventral striatum and motivational incentive salience
acquisition, in schizophrenia the largest dopamine abnormality, thought to underlie deficits of
salience acquisition, occurs in the dorsal rather than the ventral striatum (Howes et al., 2012).
For patients the relationship between the dorsal striatum function, increased presynaptic
dopamine storage and release with the dorsal striatum, aberrant salience and cognitive deficits
associated with the disorder have been unclear. As such, the current study is the first to identify
a relationship between dorsal striatal activity, cognitive control deficits associated with
schizophrenia, and clinical symptom expression of psychotic symptoms.

5.5. Limitations
Limitations of the study include the relatively modest sample size. These results should
be replicated in a larger, independent sample to support these findings. Upon reviewing the time
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course of activity during the Condition and Trial Type analysis we observed that patients
seemed to have lower activity than controls in response to the presentation of the memory set
(e.g. Figure 4.4). It is possible that behavioral deficits we observed were the results of goal
representation deficits associated with schizophrenia (reviewed in Barch & Ceaser, 2012).
Failing to adequately encode the memory set would significantly impair the ability of participants
to respond appropriately to update cues and make correct responses when probed. The impact
of goal representation deficits, while not a focus of this current study, is something that warrants
further exploration given that it may be a common mechanism of cognitive dysfunction for
schizophrenia. We should note, however, that we did not find significant differences between
patients and controls behaviorally on measures of simple maintenance and maintenance when
presented with distracters. That is, when tasked to simply maintain information over time
patients and controls had comparable maintenance performance, even when presented with
distracting information in the interim. Thus, there is evidence that patients are able to maintain
information over time but their performance decreases as task demands become more complex
(i.e. making an information update, ignoring distracters, etc).
Further, aberrant salience theories of symptom expression are based on findings of
increased dopamine synthesis capacity within the associative striatum for patients with
schizophrenia and thus altered striatal dopamine signaling. Altered dopamine signaling was not
something that was measured in this study, and thus it is not clear to what extent our findings
related to this dysfunction for patients with schizophrenia. Further work is needed to determine if,
for example, aberrant salience symptoms correspond to changes of dopamine fluctuation or if it
is associated with increased striatal activity for patients during distraction. The relationship
between brain activity, dopamine signaling, and psychosis proneness is also something that
warrants further study, as it is not clear whether subclinical symptoms expressed by nonpsychotic individuals result from the same mechanism that brings about these symptoms for
psychotic individuals. Or, perhaps a better question is what mechanisms are sufficient to bring
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about subclinical symptom expression assuming that multiple mechanisms contribute to
symptom expression? It was difficult to interpret the results of our control sample given this
ambiguity, but what was clear was that patients and controls demonstrated different patterns of
brain activity in response to the same task conditions and for individual subjects there were
different patterns of relationships between brain activity and symptom expressions for patients
and controls.
This study also lacked a psychiatric control group. We found differences between patients
and controls and we believe that these differences reflect disease pathology that is specific to
psychosis and schizophrenia. However, it may also be the case that these differences we
observed are present when comparing individuals with schizoaffective, bi-polar disorder, or a
mood disorder. Thus, future work would need to test whether the differences between patients
and controls observed in this study are specific to schizophrenia, generalize to symptoms of
psychosis more broadly, or are also present when comparing healthy individuals with individuals
who have diagnosable mental illness that do not involve psychosis. It is important to note that
aberrant salience and the mechanisms that are thought to underlie aberrant salience symptoms
are not specific to schizophrenia. As discussed in Howes et al., (2009), about 8% of the
population report psychotic experiences, and dopamine dysfunction has been observed in
family members of those individuals with schizophrenia, individuals with schizoptypy, and those
at high risk for developing psychosis. So, while our patient population consists of individuals
diagnosed with schizophrenia we believe that, because the underlying mechanism of aberrant
salience is the same, the striatal dysregulation and association with aberrant salience symptoms
will be present in other individuals experiencing, or at risk for experiencing, psychotic symptoms.
However, the question of whether differences we observed between diagnostic groups is
present when comparing psychotic and non-psychotic patient groups. With regard to aberrant
salience symptoms, to some degree this question was addressed by Cicero et al. (2010). They
examined aberrant salience scores of individuals with psychosis who were inpatients at a
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forensic state hospital with a psychiatric comparison group who were also inpatients at said
hospital. The psychiatric comparison group was composed of a variety of patients with
nonpsychotic diagnoses, including bipolar I, II, and NOS, mood disorder NOS, personality
disorders, posttraumatic stress disorder. These individuals were taking psychotropic medication,
including mood stabilizers, antidepressants, as well as antipsychotics. They found significant
differences between the psychosis group and the non-psychosis group such that the psychosis
group had higher ASI scores than the non-psychosis group, suggesting that when controlling for
illness acuity and possibly even antipsychotic medication use aberrant salience is greater for
individuals with a history of psychosis.
Finally, it is possible that antipsychotic use by our patient participants may have influenced
their results. Patient participants in this study were required to be stable on their medication for
at least 2 weeks prior to study participation. We did not assess what medications patients were
prescribed due to complexities with gathering this information that could result in, at best,
inaccurate or, at worst, misleading information about medication use and its effect on our results.
For example, there are differences between what medications a patient has been prescribed,
what medications a patient remembers being prescribed, what medications patients are actually
taking, and the extent of dopamine blockade occurring in the brain of patients – the latter point
being what we are ultimately interested in measuring. Thus, the relationship between self-report
measures of medications use and dopamine blockade are unclear. This is not to say, however,
that the influence medication use has had on our results is irrelevant. As discussed above,
increased presynaptic dopamine and subsequent dopamine release is thought to underlie
symptoms of aberrant salience. There is evidence demonstrating a relationship between
treatment response to medication and increased presynaptic dopamine synthesis capacity
(Demjaha et al., 2012), so it may be the case that because our patients were stable on their
medications the amount of dopamine release resulting from increased presynaptic dopamine
concentrations was reduced due to antipsychotic blockade. That is, antipsychotic medication
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use by our patient participants may have reduced aberrant salience symptoms and thus
attenuated the relationship between symptom expression and brain activity we observed.
However, without a direct measure of dopamine fluctuation it is difficult to say with, any certainty,
what effect medication use by patients has had on our results.

5.6. Conclusions
To our knowledge, this is the first study to find a relationship between dorsal striatal activity,
cognitive control, and aberrant incentive salience, described by Kapur (2003), in patients with
schizophrenia. We found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the basal ganglia,
particularly the associative striatum, may meaningfully contribute to the processing of cognitive
control demands via information gating. Further, while we found evidence that both the striatum
and DLPFC demonstrated altered activity during task demands, we found that for patients with
schizophrenia striatal activity was selectively associated with the expression of aberrant
salience symptoms, symptoms that are thought to result from dysregulated dopamine signaling.
These findings provide potential treatment targets that could improve symptoms and functional
outcome of patients with schizophrenia. For example, cognitive remediation that improves the
regulation of information gating, a core component of executive control, an important predictor
of functional outcome of severe mental illnesses (Berk et al., 2013; Martinez-Aran et al., 2002;
2007), should also impact aberrant salience symptom expression. Our future work will focus on
further exploring the relationship between deficits of cognition associated with psychosis and
brain functioning with the aim of developing more effective treatments for individuals with
schizophrenia that will ultimately improve their quality of life.
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7. Figure Captions
Figure 2.1: Controlled Update Task Design. Trials representing the 3 update cue events
(Upgreen, Upred, and Upempty). For each trial participants are first shown two shapes, the first
one for 1.5 seconds and then a second for 1.5 seconds. They are instructed to remember these
shapes in the order that they were presented. After a 7 second delay (Delay 1), 1 of 3 update
cue conditions occurs. During the Upgreen condition participants are shown either 1 or 2 new
shapes (one after another) framed in green and are tasked with replacing 1 or both of the
corresponding memory set items. During the Upred condition particpants are shown 1 or 2 new
shapes framed in red and are instructed to ignore these shapes and to continue remembering
the items from the memory set. During the Upempty condition participants are shown empty
boxes that are either red or green. They are told that if no new shape is presented during the
update cue they are to simply continue remembering the items from the memory set. Each box
during the update cue is presented for 1.5 seconds. A second delay (Delay 2) follows the
update cue, after which the probe is presented for 2 seconds. During the probe participants are
presented a shape and asked if it matches one of the shapes that they are currently
remembering. They respond by pressing a “yes” button or a “no” button. Probe types vary for
each update cue condition. During Upgreen, for example, participants can be probed with a
shape presented during the update cue that they should have remembered (Update trial type),
to which they should respond “yes”. Or, during an Upred trial participants can be probed with an
item presented during the update condition that they should have ignored (Resist Distracter
Lure trial type), to which they should respond “no”.
Figure 4.1: Task Accuracy for Diagnostic Groups. Task accuracy for patients (burgundy) and
controls (green). While generally patients performed numerically worse than controls on all trial
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types, these differences were only significant for the Resist Distracter Lure, Update trial types,
and Resist Maintenance trials. *p<0.05 and **p<0.01.
Figure 4.2: Brain Activity of Healthy Controls and Patients Within Regions Defined in a
Previous Data Set. The figures above list the full trial time course of brain activity of healthy
controls and patients from the current data set within regions defined in a previous data set.
Green lines represent Upgreen activity, red lines represent Upred activity, and blue lines
represent Upempty activity. “Memory Set” in the figure denotes the period during which the
memory set items are presented. “Update Cue” in the figure and the two arrow lines represent
the onset (10 seconds) and offset (13 seconds) of the update cue event. The gray box (16-24
seconds) represents the time frame used in our follow up update cue analyses (corresponding
to frames 8-12), which is shifted from the offset of the update cue to account for hemodynamic
lag. “Probe” in the figure and the arrow line at the 22 second time point indicate the onset of the
probe. We plotted the time course of brain activity for patients and controls for two
representative regions, left lateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and left lateral putamen, that
demonstrated significant effects of condition for healthy controls went on to significantly interact
with diagnosis. The regions that time courses were taken from appear in the cross hairs of the
brain figure. Controls are listed in the first column (Figure 4.2A and 3C) and patients are listed in
the second column (Figure 4.2B and 3D). These regions were selected because they represent
a region in the frontal cortex and the striatum that demonstrated condition effects for controls.
For controls we observed significant differences between Upgreen and Upempty during frames
8-12 (16-24 seconds) for the IFG (-39, 4, 30) and putamen (-18, -3, 13). We also observed a
significant difference between Upred and Upempty for the region in the IFG, but not the
putamen region for controls. The region in the IFG went on to interact with diagnosis. Patients
demonstrated a significant difference between Upgreen and Upempty during frames 8-12 (1624 seconds) for the IFG (-39, 4, 30) and a trend towards difference between Upred and
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Upempty (F(1,21) = 3.06, p = 0.095). For putamen activity of patients, we observed no
differences between either Upgreen and Upempty or Upred and Upempty.
Figure 4.3: Regions of Healthy Controls from the Current Data Set that Demonstrated
Effects of Condition. Time courses for representative regions from the frontal cortex and
striatum derived from our current sample of controls that demonstrated condition effects
following the update cue. Green lines represent Upgreen activity, red lines represent Upred
activity, and blue lines represent Upempty activity. We found that both regions demonstrated
significant differences between Upgreen and Upempty, but only the caudate demonstrated
differences between Upred and Upempty. However, we found the unexpected pattern that
Upempty activity was greater than Upred activity.
Figure 4.4: Frontal Region from the Current Data Set that Demonstrated A Diagnosis by
Condition Interaction. The time courses for a region in the middle frontal gyrus that
demonstrated an interaction of diagnosis and condition during frames 8-12 (gray box in the
figure). Green lines represent Upgreen activity, red lines represent Upred activity, and blue lines
represent Upempty activity. Again, we found that control participants demonstrated significantly
greater Upgreen versus Upempty activity in this region, and Upred activity was intermediate to
Upgreen and Upred (the difference between Upred and Upempty, however, was not significant).
Patients, however, did not demonstrate a difference between the three condition types.
Figure 4.5: Regions Demonstrating a Diagnosis by Resist Distracter Lure Trial Type
Accuracy interaction. We plotted the 2 regions (putamen, 23, 0, 4 and MFG, 40, 13, 30) that
demonstrated diagnosis by Resist Distracter Lure accuracy following the presentation of the
update cue. Red lines in the figure represent incorrect trial activity and blue lines represent
correct trial activity. During Resist Distracter Lure participants are probed with an item they were
instructed to ignore. If participants respond “no” they are correctly rejecting this item. However, if
participants respond “yes” it suggests that they inappropriately updated this item when it was
presented. “Memory Set” in the figure denotes the period during which the memory set items

102

are presented. “Update Cue” in the figure and the two arrow lines represent the onset (10
seconds) and offset (13 seconds) of the update cue event. The gray box (16-24 seconds)
represents the time frame used in our follow up update cue analyses (corresponding to frames
8-12), which is shifted from the offset of the update cue to account for hemodynamic lag.
“Probe” in the figure and the arrow line at the 22 second time point indicate the onset of the
probe. For both the putamen (top row of the figure) and MFG (bottom row of the figure) we
found that for patients incorrect trial activity was significantly greater than correct trial activity for
frames 8-12 (16-24 seconds during the trial), consistent with the idea that increases of brain
activity in these regions are associated with information updating. For controls we found the
opposite pattern, such that incorrect trial activity was significantly less than correct trial activity
for the putamen, and numerically, but not significantly, less than correct trial activity in the MFG.
Figure 4.6: Regions Demonstrating a Diagnosis by Update Trial Type Accuracy interaction.
We plotted the regions in bilateral globus pallidus that demonstrated diagnosis by Update
accuracy following the presentation of the update cue. Red lines in the figure represent incorrect
trial activity and blue lines represent correct trial activity. For the Update trial type participants
are probed with an item they should have updated during the update cue. A “yes” response
indicated they made the appropriate update, and a “no” response suggests that they did not. For
both regions of the globus pallidus patients demonstrated significantly less activity during
incorrect trials when compared with correct trials, again consistent with the idea that increases
of brain activity in these regions are associated with information updating. However, for controls
we again found the opposite pattern to patients when comparing correct and incorrect trial
activity. Controls, on the other hand, demonstrated the opposite pattern of patients, such that
activity in the left globus pallidus during incorrect trials following the presentation of the update
cue was significantly greater than activity during correct trials. Activity in the right globus pallidus
for controls did not significantly differ when comparing correct and incorrect Update activity
following the presentation of the update cue.
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Figure 4.7: Scatter Plots Depicting the Relationship Between ASI and Brain activity during
Incorrect Resist Distracter Lure Trials. We observed a significant positive correlation
between ASI and brain activity in the right lateral putamen during incorrect Resist Distracter
Lure trials for patients but not controls, such that, as predicted, the brain activity for patients who
were susceptible to distraction increased as ASI symptoms increased. If anything, putamen
activity of controls demonstrated a non-significant correlation in the opposite direction. While we
also observed a positive correlation between MFG activity during incorrect Resist Distracter
Lure trials and ASI scores for patients, this correlation did not reach significance.
Figure 4.8: Scatter Plots Depicting the Relationship Between ASI and Brain activity during
Incorrect Update Trials. We observed a significant positive correlation between ASI and brain
activity during correct Update trials in the left and right lateral globus pallidus for patients but not
controls, such that the brain activity for patients during updating increased as ASI symptoms
increased. This relationship was not expected, and suggests basal ganglia reactivity more
broadly is associated with increased ASI. For controls, we found no significant relationship
between brain activity and ASI in these same regions.
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Appendix A
Multislice image of anatomical masks of the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia
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Appendix B
Regions from the Current Data Set that Demonstrated Diagnosis by Condition Effects Within the Whole Brain
X

Y

Z

Size

Hemi

Region

BA

Effect at frames 8-12
Analysis

F

p

Dx X Cond

16.42

<0.001

Direction (Patients)

Direction (Controls)

Upgreen vs.
Upempty

Upred vs.
Upempty

Upgreen vs.
Upempty

Upred vs.
Upempty

no diff

G < E**

no diff

R < E**

Condition
-43

-69

-6

81

Left

Inferior Occipital Gyrus

19

35

-77

3

196

Right

Middle Occipital Gyrus

19

-39

-40

40

69

Left

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

-39

0

52

24

Left

Middle Frontal Gyrus

-20

-5

11

33

Left

Putamen

19

-17

7

122

Right

Thalamus

-18

-17

0

62

Left

Thalamus

-47

-50

-12

29

Left

Fusiform Gyrus

37

6

Diagnosis

45

-49

-7

25

Right

Sub-Gyral

37

-42

16

4

234

Left

Insula

13

36

15

4

62

Right

Insula

13

-55

-36

1

23

Left

Middle Temporal Gyrus

22

-40

44

10

80

Left

Middle Frontal Gyrus

46

-31

-53

35

173

Left

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

-45

-2

36

107

Left

Precentral Gyrus

6

37

6

32

23

Right

Precentral Gyrus

9

27

-64

32

21

Right

Precuneus

7

-4

11

57

240

Left

Superior Frontal Gyrus

6

29

-68

-37

261

Right

Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule

-23

-70

-46

76

Left

Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule

-2

-74

-40

24

Left

Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule

-34

-67

-31

23

Left

Pyramis

43

30

Right

Precuneus

11

85

Right

Putamen

Condition X Diagnosis
18

-43

7

Condition X Time
18

5

106

-19

-4

9

290

Left

Lateral Globus Pallidus

0

-68

15

5869

Left

Posterior Cingulate

31

21

33

-11

30

Right

Middle Frontal Gyrus

11

-40

-8

-14

22

Left

Sub-Gyral

21

11

60

-6

21

Right

Superior Frontal Gyrus

10

-51

12

-1

54

Left

Superior Temporal Gyrus

22

-19

-34

-2

44

Left

Parahippocampal Gyrus

27

-56

-37

-3

36

Left

Middle Temporal Gyrus

21

18

-33

0

63

Right

Parahippocampal Gyrus

27

-2

-42

17

226

Left

Posterior Cingulate

29

-7

11

41

2292

Left

Cingulate Gyrus

32

5

-79

21

38

Right

Cuneus

18

47

-33

23

22

Right

Insula

13

-3

-36

46

49

Left

Precuneus

29

21

8

24

Right

Claustrum

-28

23

4

34

Left

Claustrum

32

-65

-46

28

Right

Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule

7

Diagnosis X Time
18

-23

24

31

Right

Caudate

-18

-5

23

22

Left

Caudate

32

-90

-16

36

Right

Inferior Occipital Gyrus

18

47

-58

-11

94

Right

Fusiform Gyrus

37

-45

-76

-13

64

Left

Fusiform Gyrus

19

-23

-86

-8

125

Left

Inferior Occipital Gyrus

18

3

33

3

208

Right

Anterior Cingulate

24

27

28

-4

24

Right

Inferior Frontal Gyrus

47

-51

0

21

475

Left

Inferior Frontal Gyrus

44

-39

43

7

114

Left

Middle Frontal Gyrus

46

-31

24

3

41

Left

Inferior Frontal Gyrus

45

-5

-100

7

50

Left

Cuneus

18

55

1

8

22

Right

Precentral Gyrus

-41

33

24

59

Left

Middle Frontal Gyrus

46

6

-44

-62

18

24

Left

Middle Temporal Gyrus

39

25

7

27

50

Right

Middle Frontal Gyrus

8

52

-8

30

73

Right

Precentral Gyrus

6

107

27

-66

33

97

Right

Precuneus

7

-31

-52

35

254

Left

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

49

21

27

33

Right

Middle Frontal Gyrus

46

0

40

41

49

Left

Medial Frontal Gyrus

8

-1

-46

37

47

Left

Precuneus

31

37

-43

47

114

Right

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

-26

1

48

47

Left

Middle Frontal Gyrus

6

-5

8

61

154

Left

Superior Frontal Gyrus

6

-2

-25

64

28

Left

Medial Frontal Gyrus

6

-16

-27

65

22

Left

Precentral Gyrus

4

-28

-34

67

28

Left

Postcentral Gyrus

2

-14

-40

-46

29

Left

Cerebellar Tonsil

31

-64

-49

27

Right

Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule

-36

-60

-47

24

Left

Cerebellar Tonsil

-24

-53

-46

49

Left

Cerebellar Tonsil

33

-65

-29

81

Right

Tuber

-22

-58

-25

50

Left

Culmen

Condition X Time X Diagnosis
-41

-74

-9

21

Left

Fusiform Gyrus

19

Dx X Cond

3.64

0.04

G > E**

R > E**

G > E**

R > E**

-40

-45

43

45

Left

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

Dx X Cond

5.98

0.004

no diff

no diff

G > E**

no diff

-5

10

58

72

Left

Superior Frontal Gyrus

6

Dx X Cond

8.58

<0.001

no diff

no diff

G > E**

no diff

Regions from the current data set that demonstrated task effects in the whole brain. They are organized on the left side under headings like
“Diagnosis” or “Condition X Time” based on whether they demonstrated these effects when examining all 15 time frames of the trial. Because we
were only interested in regions that demonstrated effects that interacted with both diagnosis and condition we only conduced follow up tests on these
regions. Statistics from the update cue response analysis can be found under the heading “Effect at frames 8-12”. G = Upgreen trials, E = Upempty
trials, and R = Upred trials. *p<0.05 and **p<0.01, uncorrected. “no diff” signifies no statistically significant difference.
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Appendix C
Regions Demonstrating an Effect of Diagnosis by Resist Distracter Lure Trial Type Accuracy within the Whole Brain
X

Y

Z

Size

Hemisphere

Region

BA

Effect at frames 8-12
Analysis

Correct vs. Incorrect

F

p

Patients

Controls

Diagnosis
-43

-6

34

105

Left

Precentral Gyrus

6

-26

-58

32

52

Left

Angular Gyrus

39

-8

22

41

21

Left

Cingulate Gyrus

32

23

-2

41

25

Right

Middle Frontal Gyrus

6

-5

9

58

63

Left

Superior Frontal Gyrus

6

43

-64

-26

30

Right Cerebellum

Tuber

-30

-59

39

29

Left

Angular Gyrus

-34

-26

54

59

Left

Precentral Gyrus

4

14

38

23

Right

Middle Frontal Gyrus

8

Dx X Acc

21.56

<0.001

cor < incor

cor > incor

47
-10
Accuracy X
Time

45

25

Right

Precentral Gyrus

4

Dx X Acc

11.69

0.002

cor < incor

cor > incor

Accuracy
39

Diagnosis X Accuracy
34

17

-18

8

47

Right

Thalamus

-11

-21

12

54

Left

Thalamus

2

61

0

77

Right

Middle Frontal Gyrus

10

-34

12

2

24

Left

Insula

13

-50

-16

14

129

Left

Postcentral Gyrus

43

-33

-14

11

22

Left

Insula

13

-4

-54

7

28

Left

Posterior Cingulate

30

10

-68

28

59

Right

Cuneus

7

-4

-66

45

217

Left

Precuneus

7

109

-3

26

34

21

Left

Cingulate Gyrus

-39

-26

55

58

Left

Postcentral Gyrus

5

-51

-1

57

Right Cerebellum

Culmen

17
-65
Diagnosis X
Time

-16

56

Right Cerebellum

Declive

32
3

-22

-7

28

21

Left

Caudate

0

-33

9

36

Right

Thalamus

49

-61

-12

116

Right

Fusiform Gyrus

37

33

-39

-15

21

Right

Fusiform Gyrus

20

-43

-75

-13

33

Left

Fusiform Gyrus

19

-15

41

-4

65

Left

Anterior Cingulate

32

-41

44

11

26

Left

Middle Frontal Gyrus

10

-37

32

18

25

Left

Middle Frontal Gyrus

46

46

19

24

33

Right

Middle Frontal Gyrus

46

-11

-22

70

88

Left

Medial Frontal Gyrus

6

-35

42

30

57

Left

Middle Frontal Gyrus

9

-25

-64

31

37

Left

Precuneus

7

27

-66

31

32

Right

Precuneus

39

-42

50

196

Right

Inferior Parietal Lobule

27

-15

63

115

Right

Precentral Gyrus

6

-42

15

40

24

Left

Precentral Gyrus

9

7

-36

-45

47

43

Left

Inferior Parietal Lobule

0

-72

-13

23

Left Cerebellum

Declive of Vermis

-24

-80

-25

35

Left Cerebellum

Uvula

40

40

Regions from the current data set that demonstrated diagnosis by Resist Update Lure accuracy. They are organized on the left side under
headings like “Diagnosis” or “Accuracy” based on whether they demonstrated these effects when examining all 15 time frames of the trial.
We only conducted follow up analyses for the update cue period on regions that demonstrated a significant interaction of accuracy and
diagnosis. Statistics from the update cue response analysis can be found under the heading “Effect at frames 8-12”. “cor” = correct trials and
“incor” = incorrect trials. *p<0.05 and **p<0.01, uncorrected. “no diff” signifies no statistically significant difference.
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Appendix D
Regions Demonstrating an Effect of Diagnosis by Update Trial Type Accuracy with the Whole Brain
X

Y

Z

Size

Hemisphere

Region

BA

Effect at frames 8-12
Analysis

F

p

Correct vs. Incorrect
Patients

Controls

Diagnosis
1

-16

6

912

Right

Thalamus

-45

23

6

239

Left

Inferior Frontal Gyrus

45

25

28

-2

25

Right

Inferior Frontal Gyrus

47

-30

20

3

50

Left

Insula

13

32

15

4

46

Right

Insula

13

-46

-4

33

204

Left

Precentral Gyrus

6

49

-11

23

28

Right

Precentral Gyrus

6

0

-29

29

33

Left

Cingulate Gyrus

23

-27

-63

29

30

Left

Precuneus

7

-39

-46

41

81

Left

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

-4

12

56

283

Left

Superior Frontal Gyrus

6

-30

-1

52

33

Left

Middle Frontal Gyrus

6

1

-29

67

66

Right

Paracentral Lobule

6

-6

-21

-13

54

Left Brainstem

Red Nucleus

-28

-40

-43

32

Left Cerebellum

Cerebellar Tonsil

33

-69

-45

38

Right Cerebellum

Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule

-29

-70

-46

52

Left Cerebellum

Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule

2

39

Left

Thalamus

Dx X Acc

10.98

0.002

no diff

cor < incor**

Thalamus

Dx X Acc

8.63

0.006

no diff

cor < incor*

Red Nucleus

Dx X Acc

5.43

0.03

cor > incor*

cor < incor*

Diagnosis X Accuracy
-20

-21

13

-25

2

25

Right

-5

-27

-11

27

Left Brainstem

-5

36

Left

Accuracy X Time
0

42

Anterior Cingulate

111

32

-44

10

30

21

Left

Inferior Frontal Gyrus

9

-36

-31

43

57

Left

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

23

24

40

59

Right

Middle Frontal Gyrus

8

25

-4

44

56

Right

Middle Frontal Gyrus

6

-27

1

50

124

Left

Middle Frontal Gyrus

6

-24

-43

-9

33

Left

Parahippocampal Gyrus

36

-20

-70

42

59

Left

Precuneus

7

-3

15

55

203

Left

Superior Frontal Gyrus

6

36

-41

9

30

Right

Superior Temporal Gyrus

41

Diagnosis X Time
-8

-70

32

33

Left

Cuneus

7

52

-59

-18

27

Right

Fusiform Gyrus

37

-40

44

3

124

Left

Inferior Frontal Gyrus

10

-35

-45

45

21

Left

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

1

-92

-14

55

Right

Lingual Gyrus

18

0

38

40

31

Left

Medial Frontal Gyrus

8

-3

-26

65

26

Left

Medial Frontal Gyrus

6

-43

8

47

48

Left

Middle Frontal Gyrus

6

-55

11

9

23

Left

Precentral Gyrus

44

-54

-3

20

23

Left

Precentral Gyrus

6

42

17

35

22

Right

Precentral Gyrus

9

29

-67

29

39

Right

Precuneus

19

36

-42

37

23

Right

Sub-Gyral

40

-6

12

60

120

Left

Superior Frontal Gyrus

6

-48

-66

-16

30

Left Cerebellum

23

Right

Declive

Diagnosis X Accuracy X Time
25

42

5

Medial Frontal Gyrus

10

Dx X Acc

2.33

0.14

Regions within our anatomical masks from the current data set that demonstrated diagnosis by Update accuracy. They are organized on the
left side under headings like “Diagnosis” or “Accuracy” based on whether they demonstrated these effects when examining all 15 time
frames of the trial. We only conducted follow up analyses for the update cue period on regions that demonstrated a significant interaction of
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accuracy and diagnosis. Statistics from the update cue response analysis can be found under the heading “Effect at frames 8-12”. “cor” =
correct trials and “incor” = incorrect trials. *p<0.05 and **p<0.01, uncorrected. “no diff” signifies no statistically significant difference.
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Appendix E
D’ Analysis of Behavioral Data
We also examined our behavioral data using d’, where correct responses during Update
trials were considered “hits” and incorrect responses during Resist Maintenance were
considered “false alarms”. Both hits and false alarms were z-scored and then subtracted from
one another (zHits-zFalse Alarms) to create the d’ of updating (UP_D’). Similarly, we created d’
using the same method for distracter trials by using correct responses of Resist Distracter trials
as hits and incorrect responses of Resist Distracter Lure trials as false alarms (RM_D’). These
two d’ prime variables give an account of the signal to noise ratio when participants are tasked
with making an update or ignoring distracting information. Box plots of the d’ scores for each
variable and each group can been seen in the figures below. To determine if d’ differed between
trials and between groups we conduced a 2 x 2 ANOVA with trial d’ (UP_D’ and RM_D’) and
diagnosis (patients and controls) as factors. We also included age and ethnicity as covariates,
given that these demographic variables were found to differ between diagnostic groups. We
found a significant main effect of diagnosis (F(1,38) = 16.99, p < 0.001), but no main effect of
trial type (F(1,38) = 0.21, p = 0.65) and no interaction of trial type and diagnosis (F(1,38) = 1.39,
p = 0.25). With regard to the effect of diagnosis, d’ scores for patients were lower than controls
(as seen in the box plots). This was true for both trial conditions. We also examined the
correlation between d’ and symptom scores separately for patients and controls. For patients,
we found that RM_D’ did not correlate with any symptoms measures we examined (including
aberrant salience). When examining UP_D’, we again did not find a significant correlation with
aberrant salience, but found a significant negative correlation with physical anhedonia (r= -0.57,
p = 0.005). For controls, however, we found significant negative correlations between RM_D’
and aberrant salience (r= -0.49, p = 0.03) and magical ideation (r= -0.57, p = 0.009), and
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significant correlations between UP_D’ and aberrant salience (r= -0.52, p = 0.02) and magical
ideation (r= -0.54, p = 0.006).

Box plots of d’ scores for RM_D’ (top) and UP_D’ (bottom). Patients are group 1 and
controls are group 2. Cases identified as outliers were examined and were found to be high
performing patients for the RM_D’ condition and a patient who performed poorly during the false
alarm trial for the UP_D’ condition. The upper and lower bound of the box represent the 75th and
25th percentile, respectively. The dark line in the box represents the median for each group.
Upper and lower whiskers represent the maximum and minimum values, respectively. Outliers
were values that fell outside of 1.5 times the inner quartile range.
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Appendix F
A Breakdown of the Number of Trials for Each Task Condition and Trial Type
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